Chalice Stallworth v. Seattle School District No 1

FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 17 2015
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
BEVERLY ANETTE RAINES, Principal, No. 13-35304
Brighton School,
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00203-TSZ
Plaintiff, Western District of Washington,
Seattle
And
CHALICE STALLWORTH, Elementary ORDER
School Teacher,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 1, a
municipal corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Before: NOONAN, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
The Clerk shall file the attached amended memorandum disposition in place
of the memorandum disposition filed on September 10, 2015.
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 17 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BEVERLY ANETTE RAINES, Principal, No. 13-35304
Brighton School,
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00203-TSZ
Plaintiff,
AMENDED
And MEMORANDUM*
CHALICE STALLWORTH, Elementary
School Teacher,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 1, a
municipal corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 4, 2015**
Seattle, Washington
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: NOONAN, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Chalice Stallworth appeals a jury verdict in favor of defendant Seattle
School District No. 1 (the District). She raises several claims of error, but we
affirm.
Ms. Stallworth first argues that the district court erred by trying her case
jointly with that of co-plaintiff Audrey Weaver. In a July 1, 2011, order, the
district court asked the plaintiffs to determine whether they “should be divided into
two groups as outlined in [an earlier order] or in some other fashion.” Ms.
Stallworth’s July 18, 2011, response suggested that “[f]or the purpose of trial and
dispositive motions,” she “would like to be grouped” with Ms. Weaver. The court
complied with this request. Ms. Stallworth claims on appeal that the district court
erred in doing so. But because she “both invited the error, and relinquished a
known right” by abandoning a prior motion to sever and asking the court to group
her case with Ms. Weaver’s for trial, any “error is waived and therefore
unreviewable” on appeal. United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc).
Ms. Stallworth next argues that the district court erred by allowing the
District to refer to her “dishonesty” in its opening statement and closing argument
to the jury. A new trial is appropriate when attorney misconduct “sufficiently
2
permeat[ed] [the] entire proceeding to provide conviction that the jury was
influenced by passion and prejudice in reaching its verdict.” Settlegoode v.
Portland Pub. Sch., 371 F.3d 503, 516–17 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kehr v. Smith
Barney, 736 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984)). “There is an even ‘high[er]
threshold’ for granting a new trial where, as here, [appellant] failed to object to the
alleged misconduct during trial.” Id. at 517 (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frank
Coluccio Constr. Co., 785 F.2d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1986)). There was no error.
The District’s defense at trial was that it did not need to provide Ms. Stallworth
with the accommodation she requested because she interned with another school
district while on unpaid leave in 2007–08, which demonstrated that her injuries
were not as serious as she suggested and justified terminating her contract for
2008–09. The District’s statements about Ms. Stallworth’s dishonesty regarding
her need for an accommodation were at the heart of its theory of the case and were
not improper.
Next, Ms. Stallworth argues that the district court erred by limiting the
plaintiffs’ trial presentation to fifteen hours shared between her and Ms. Weaver.
Because Ms. Stallworth did not object at trial to the district court’s time limitation,
she must show an obvious error that affected her fundamental rights and “reach[ed]
the pinnacle of fault” envisioned by the plain error standard. C.B. v. City of
3
Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1018 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting Hemmings v.
Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002)). Ms. Stallworth has not
identified any specific witness she could not call, crucial testimony she could not
present, or exhibit she could not show, nor does she explain how she was
prejudiced by the time limitation. The district court did not commit plain error.
Ms. Stallworth also argues that the district court erred by including a
sentence in Jury Instruction No. 14B that related solely to Ms. Weaver’s claim and
stated that the District did not have a duty to provide her with a new supervisor.
She relatedly claims that the court erred by not providing “further instruction about
the duty to affirmatively assist in finding alternative jobs and reassigning disabled
individuals,” and that the court should have instructed the jury that school districts
“do have a duty to transfer disabled teachers to positions for which they qualify in
and/or out of certificated employment.” Ms. Stallworth did not object to this
instruction at trial, however, so we review for plain error. C.B., 769 F.3d at 1018.
We conclude that the jury instruction adequately captured Washington state law by
stating: “An employer must provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee
with an impairment unless the employer can show that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the employer” and by providing examples of an
acceptable reasonable accommodation under the Washington Law Against
4
Discrimination. The district court did not plainly err by omitting the more specific
instruction that Ms. Stallworth now requests on appeal.
Finally, Ms. Stallworth argues that the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to instruct the jury about the meaning of “employment contract” under
Washington state law to supplement an instruction that implied that Ms. Stallworth
was not entitled to a reasonable accommodation if she had signed employment
contracts with two school districts for the same term. The district court denied the
request because it was “not aware of any such pattern instruction” for the term
“employment contract” and it would not “give it unless there is such a pattern
instruction.” Ms. Stallworth did not object further, nor did she propose an
instruction defining these terms. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the instruction because of Ms. Stallworth’s lack of specificity. See United
States v. Flores-Solis, 433 F.2d 945, 946 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). Nor are the
words “employment contract” confusing or technical such that the jury required
further guidance to interpret the instruction. See United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d
1470, 1485 (9th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
5