Shawncey Blake v. Gillote

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 5 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHAWNCEY BLAKE, No. 16-15716
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-03727-HSG
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GILLOTE, Sgt.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 3, 2018**
Before: TROTT, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Shawncey Blake, a former inmate in Santa Clara County jail, appeals pro se
from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
retaliation and violation of his right to access the courts. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1267 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Blake’s First
Amendment retaliation claim. Blake failed adequately to support his assertion that
his punishment for knowingly violating a lawful direct order did not serve a
legitimate penological goal.
Rule 2011 of the Santa Clara Department of Corrections Inmate Rules of
Conduct requires inmates to obey all lawful orders from custody staff. Blake
admits he violated a direct order from Sgt. Gillotte. As contended by the
Appellees, Rule 2-11 is the “foundation” of their department’s ability to maintain
control of their population. A custodial institution’s ability to control its inmates
indisputably serves a legitimate penological purpose. See id. at 1269 (elements of
a retaliation claim in the prison context); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47
(1979) (preserving order and discipline is a legitimate goal of a correctional
institutional).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Blake’s access-to-
courts and to litigate claims because Blake failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants’ actions caused the dismissal of his prior
action. See Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102-04 (9th Cir. 2011)
(discussing requirements for an access-to-court claim premised on prison officials’
alleged interference with any prisoner lawsuit), overruled on other grounds Richey
2 16-15716
v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Blake’s right-to-
petition claim because Blake failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
his argument that the relevant prison regulations concerning medical records and
grievances did not advance legitimate correctional goals. See O’Keefe v. Van
Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (setting forth claim for right to petition
the government for redress of their grievances).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Blake’s request for
judicial notice of an internal affairs letter. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d
668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and acceptable matters
for judicial notice).
AFFIRMED.
3 16-15716