Stanley Clarke v. City of Madera

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 10 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STANLEY BRADFORD CLARKE, No. 08-15751
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:07-CV-01806-LJO-
DLB
v.
CITY OF MADERA; et al., MEMORANDUM *
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 16, 2010 **
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Stanley Bradford Clarke appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. He
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
JS/Research
also appeals from the order denying his motion for reconsideration. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to
state a claim and a dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. Kwai Fun Wong v.
United States, 373 F.3d 952, 966 n.18 (9th Cir. 2004). We review for an abuse of
discretion an order denying reconsideration. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County,
Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the federal claims against the City of
Madera because Clarke failed to allege constitutional deprivations resulting from
any official custom or policy. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
The district court properly dismissed the federal claims against the
remaining defendants on qualified immunity grounds because, regardless of the
constitutionality of their actions, defendants did not violate any of Clarke’s clearly
established rights. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815, 818 (2009)
(explaining that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity if their
conduct does not violate a clearly established federal statutory or constitutional
right, and holding that courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of
the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances of the case).
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The district court properly dismissed the state law claims because Clarke’s
government tort claim did not include facts concerning the basis for his claim and
thus failed to substantially comply with the California Tort Claims Act. See
Nguyen v. L.A. County Harbor/UCLA Med. Ctr., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 712 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that the purpose of the Act is to provide the public
entity with sufficient information to allow it to investigate and evaluate the claim
to determine whether to settle the claim without the cost of litigation).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend
because Clarke had amended the complaint three times and pointed to no
additional facts that could cure the deficiencies. See Metzler Inv. GMBH v.
Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district
court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has
previously amended the complaint.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Clarke’s motion for
reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263 (“[T]he failure to file
documents in an original motion or opposition does not turn the late filed
documents into ‘newly discovered evidence’”).
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Clarke forfeited his right to challenge the timeliness of defendants’ removal
of this action by failing to object in the district court. See Fristoe v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
Clarke’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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