Barry Nnanna v. William Barr

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 20 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BARRY UCHE NNANNA, AKA Bathram No. 15-72955
Eko Isa,
Agency No. A024-995-612
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 7, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Barry Nnanna, a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitions for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Pechenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444,
448 (9th Cir. 2012). Reviewing legal questions de novo and the agency’s factual
findings for substantial evidence, see Diaz-Jimenez v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 955, 958
(9th Cir. 2018), we deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part.
1. The BIA did not err in concluding that Nnanna committed an offense
“relating to . . . forgery.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R). That term “include[s]
activities ancillary to the core offense” such as “possession of counterfeit or forged
documents.” Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 877 (9th Cir. 2008). “By
penalizing those who knowingly use or possess [forged] bills with the intent to
defraud,” Nnanna’s crime of conviction “seeks to discourage [forging] through the
criminalization of the use of its end product” and is therefore a crime relating to
forgery. Albillo-Figueroa v. INS, 221 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 18
U.S.C. § 510(a)(2). Consequently, Nnanna is statutorily ineligible for asylum.
2. We lack jurisdiction to review Nnanna’s claim that the IJ “did not
properly assess the underlying facts of the conviction” in determining that he was
ineligible for withholding of removal because he committed a particularly serious
crime under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). See Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712
F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that we “cannot reweigh evidence to
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determine if the crime was indeed particularly serious” (quoting Afridi v. Gonzales,
442 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2006))). We therefore dismiss this claim.
We have jurisdiction to review his claim that the agency “failed to consider
the appropriate factors . . . in making the ‘particularly serious crime’
determination.” Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). Contrary to Nnanna’s argument, “a separate determination of
danger to the community is not required” when the agency “makes a finding that
an offense constitutes a particularly serious crime.” Id. at 679 (quoting
Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)). We therefore deny
the petition as to this claim.
3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Nnanna is
ineligible for CAT relief because he failed to “prove that it is more likely than not
that he . . . will be tortured in [Nigeria]” with the government’s acquiescence.
Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 914 (9th Cir. 2018). Nnanna provided no
evidence that he could not relocate to southern Nigeria where Christians are in the
majority, and the agency cited evidence that the Nigerian government “has
condemned [the insurgent] attacks” and “reassure[d] Nigerians . . . that all those
involved . . . will be made to face the full wrath of the law.” We therefore deny the
petition as to the CAT claim.
PETITION DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.
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