Nylonda Sharnese v. State of California

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 04 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
NYLONDA JAZZ SHARNESE, an No. 12-55407
individual; et al.,
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-06796-VAP-
Plaintiffs - Appellants, MAN
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 10, 2013**
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and SEDWICK, District
Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable John W. Sedwick, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
Nylonda Sharnese and Ronald Shea appeal the district court’s order
dismissing their civil action against Michael A. Latin, Patti Sundstrom, and the
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Latin was a superior court
judge when the events giving rise to the action took place, and Sundstrom was a
court reporter. Having carefully considered the district court’s order and the
findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, we now affirm the
dismissal of the action but reduce the amount of sanctions.
(1) State Sovereign Immunity
States have sovereign immunity from suits by their own citizens and citizens
of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1974). California
state courts are “arms of the state” for purposes of sovereign immunity. See
Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). Although Congress may
render states liable in federal court by exercising its enforcement powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), Congress
did not do so with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). The doctrine of state sovereign immunity bars
appellants’ claims against the superior court, with the exception of Shea’s claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
(2) Judicial Immunity
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Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit for judges acting in a judicial
capacity, so long as the judge has not acted “in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). It is “not overcome
by allegations of bad faith or malice.” See id. at 11. Most of the factual allegations
against Judge Latin concern judicial actions taken with regard to cases in the
superior court over which the court had subject matter jurisdiction. See Ashelman
v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986). The only claim against Judge Latin
that may possibly arise from nonjudicial conduct is the § 1985 claim concerning
the alleged conspiracy with Sundstrom to falsify court transcripts. We need not
determine the applicability of judicial immunity to this conduct because appellants’
§ 1985 claims were properly dismissed on other grounds, as discussed below. We
uphold the district court’s dismissal of all other claims against Judge Latin under
the doctrine of judicial immunity.
(3) Claims under § 1985
A cognizable claim under the relevant clauses of § 1985 requires an
allegation of racial or class-based animus. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Neither appellants’ original complaint nor their proposed
amended complaint specifically alleged such animus. On appeal, appellants argue
that Judge Latin manifested animus against “multiple poor and impoverished
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clients of Mr. Shea.” But, as explained, the doctrine of judicial immunity applies
to the judge’s actions with respect to these litigants. As for the conspiracy between
Judge Latin and Sundstrom, appellants do not allege that the alteration of the court
transcript was motivated by racial or class-based animus. Rather, the proposed
amended complaint asserts that the alterations were “intentionally entered for the
purpose of concealing judicial misconduct and the egregious bias of Judge Michael
Latin.” Because appellants do not allege racial or class-based animus with regard
to conduct that is not covered by some form of immunity, their § 1985 claims were
properly dismissed. See Usher, 828 F.2d at 561.
(4) ADA Claim
Appellees acknowledge that sovereign immunity does not bar Shea’s ADA
claim against the superior court. To state a cognizable claim under Title II, Shea
needed to allege discrimination by reason of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132;
Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.
1997). Shea did not allege that anyone in the court was aware of his disability
when the events complained of arose. Nor does he allege that he requested
accommodation for his disability. Because he cannot show that any court
employee took actions “by reason of” a disability of which they were unaware, the
ADA claim was properly dismissed.
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(5) Claim under California Law
It is unnecessary for this court to decide whether the district court had the
power to grant declaratory relief for alleged violations of the California Code of
Civil Procedure. Once all federal actions were dismissed from the action, the
district court acted within its discretion in declining to hear remaining state law
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
(6) Leave to Amend
Federal courts freely grant leave to amend a complaint “when justice so
requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Granting leave to amend is not required
when amendment would be futile. Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042,
1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008). Appellants put forth a proposed amended complaint that
does not cure the fatal defects concerning judicial immunity, state sovereign
immunity, or the failure to state cognizable claims under § 1985 and the ADA. As
the district court concluded, these defects are fundamental. “Appellants fail to
state what additional facts they would plead if given leave to amend . . . .
Accordingly, amendment would be futile.” Id. at 1052.
(7) Rule 11 Sanctions
All aspects of a district court’s Rule 11 determination are reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). Here,
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appellants requested sanctions against appellees’ counsel for making legal
arguments, and taking actions in litigation, with which appellants did not agree. As
the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge demonstrate, appellants’
arguments are without legal merit. The district court appropriately exercised its
discretion in refusing to grant appellants’ request for sanctions.
The central purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is “to deter baseless filings in
District Court,” but courts must also be sensitive to the dangers of chilling
vigorous advocacy. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1363
(9th Cir. 1990). Shea’s complaint alleges, and the appellees do not dispute, that he
is receiving social security disability payments. The substance and style of Shea’s
arguments for sanctions—in particular, accusing opposing counsel of “fraud”—are
professionally irresponsible. Nonetheless, because the sanction imposed is more
than sufficient to deter similar conduct in the future, we reduce the sanction against
Shea from $2,760 to $500.
AFFIRMED IN PART and VACATED IN PART. Appellants’ requests
for judicial notice are deemed MOOT.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
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FILED
Sharnese v. State of California, No. 12-55407 NOV 04 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, concurring. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
On occasion, the imposition of sanctions, though permissible, tends to
increase rather than facilitate the litigation at issue. This, to me, is one of those
instances in which the district court might best use its discretion to refrain from
following the normal course, and ignore conduct that may well be worthy of
reproach. Sometimes it is best simply to be practical and take into account the
human frailties of litigants or even counsel. To the extent that Shea can learn from
sanctions, he has probably reached his limit. I would recommend that Judge
Phillips vacate the sanctions rather than reduce them and thus avoid any possibility
of further misunderstanding.