James Warren v. Chris Wyant

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 17 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES M. WARREN, No. 12-35720
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 6:10-cv-00020-DWM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHRIS WYANT,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 7, 2014
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and KOBAYASHI, District
Judge.**
When James Michael Warren entered Montana State Prison, he was not
allowed to keep his copy of Taking Up the Runes, a book he claims is central to his
practice of Odinism. The parties agree that prison policy allowed prisoners to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
bring a copy of the Bible, the Torah or the Koran through the intake process.
Warren brought a § 1983 claim against state agencies and officials for violation of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Prisoners Act (RLUIPA) and his
constitutional rights. On the recommendation of the magistrate judge who
screened Warren’s complaint, the district court dismissed Warren’s claims against
all defendants before they were served except Chris Wyant, the officer who
conducted his intake. The district court later granted summary judgment in favor
of Officer Wyant on all counts. Warren appeals both rulings.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the district
court’s orders de novo. Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir.
2000). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
1. The district court erred by granting summary judgment on
Warren’s RLUIPA claim against Officer Wyant.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Wyant on
Warren’s RLUIPA claim, finding that “Warren does not deny that he can order . . .
religious books from the prison canteen, and he has not shown that ordering and
using these items would significantly pressure him to alter his religious beliefs or
violate them in any way.” But Warren did allege in his amended complaint that he
has no money to purchase a replacement copy of the book through the prison
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canteen. The district court’s finding was thus an impermissible shifting of the
burden of proof to Warren at the summary judgment level. Genuine issues of
material fact remain, including whether Taking Up the Runes is available for
purchase through the prison canteen, whether Warren can afford to purchase a
copy, and, if not, whether Warren’s practice of Odinism would be substantially
burdened without it. Summary judgment on this claim was inappropriate.
2. The district court erred by granting summary judgment on
Warren’s constitutional claims against Officer Wyant.
After concluding that Warren did not allege “a significantly great restriction
or onus” to obtain protection under RLUIPA, the district court reasoned that,
“because RLUIPA imposes a stricter standard than any of the other claims Warren
raised in his Complaint, those claims also fail.” The district court granted
summary judgment on Warren’s Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and
Equal Protection Clause claims against Officer Wyant. Officer Wyant concedes
that “there is a flaw in the district court’s reasoning . . . because the district court
did not actually apply RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny analysis.”
Officer Wyant urges the panel to rule in the first instance that the Montana
State Prison policy satisfies strict scrutiny and the rational basis test, and urges us
to affirm the dismissal of Warren’s constitutional claims. This court gives a great
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deal of deference to prison officials in the administration of prisons, especially
when security concerns are implicated. See United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d
731, 774 (9th Cir. 2012) (Wallace, J., concurring). But questions of fact preclude
summary judgment in this case, including whether a strict prohibition on bringing
religious books into the facility is necessary to stop contraband from entering the
prison and the administrative difficulties, if any, of implementing a more lenient
rule, such as a rule that allows each prisoner to bring one holy book into the prison
regardless of its denomination. The record on appeal cannot conclusively answer
these questions. We therefore remand for consideration of whether the prison’s
policy violates Warren’s constitutional rights.
We note that, since Warren entered Montana State Prison, the policy
regarding the property inmates may take through the intake process has been
revised. See MSP 4.1.1 III(H)(3) (2011), available at
http://www.cor.mt.gov/content/Resources/Policy/MSPprocedures/4-1-1InmateAd
missionsProcess.pdf. Prisoners are no longer allowed to take holy books of any
kind through the intake screening process. On remand, the district court should
consider whether the new policy moots any of Warren’s claims.
3. Officer Wyant may be entitled to qualified immunity.
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In her motion for summary judgment, Officer Wyant argued that she is
entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted her summary judgment
motion on other grounds and did not reach the qualified immunity question.
“[O]ur general assumption is that we operate more effectively as a reviewing court
than as a court of first instance,” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1248–49 (9th
Cir. 2013) (en banc), and we decline to decide this issue in the first instance.
4. The district court may have erred by dismissing the other state
officials named in Warren’s complaint.
Warren argues that the district court improperly dismissed his claims against
the other state officials named in his complaint. Claims for money damages
against these defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and were properly dismissed. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
663 (1974).
But suits for prospective relief against individuals in their official capacities
are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
155–56 (1908). The district court found that declaratory relief was unwarranted.
Because we reverse the dismissal of Warren’s constitutional claims, this claim
shall also be reconsidered on remand. The district court also ruled that Warren’s
request for prospective relief was mooted by his transfer to Crossroads
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Correctional Center, a private correctional facility. “It is true that when a prisoner
is moved from a prison, his action will usually become moot as to conditions at
that particular facility.” Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368–69 (9th Cir.1995)). Warren argues, however,
that his transfer failed to rectify the injury because he still is not in possession of
his book. The record does not reveal whether Warren could have brought his copy
of Taking Up the Runes to Crossroads Correctional Center had he been allowed to
bring it through intake at Montana State Prison. We therefore vacate the dismissal
of Warren’s claims for prospective relief against the other state officials named in
his complaint, and instruct the district court to address the issue of injunctive relief
on remand.
As to Warren’s claims against these defendants in their personal capacities,
Warren failed to allege that the defendants, who at best acted in supervisory roles,
“personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiff's rights, or caused such a
deprivation to occur.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th
Cir. 1981). Although we interpret pro se complaints liberally, we “may not supply
essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory
allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to
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withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. The district court did not err by ruling that,
after being given an opportunity to amend his complaint, Warren’s amended
complaint was insufficiently specific in its allegations against these entities.
We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for proceedings
consistent with this disposition. Costs on appeal shall be taxed against Appellee
Wyant. See FED. R. APP. P. 39(d)(1); Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.1.
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