Martin Reiner v. State of California

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUG 14 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MARTIN REINER, No. 13-55437
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-08649-JST-RZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Department of Industrial Relations; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 12, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: CLIFTON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN Circuit Judges.
Martin Reiner, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. §1983 action alleging constitutional violations in
connection with sanctions he received in a state administrative proceeding. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may affirm on any ground
supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district court. Forest
Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003). We review
de novo the district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Noel v.
Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Claims 4 and 5 of Reiner’s complaint
as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they constituted de facto
appeals of prior state court decisions and raised claims inextricably intertwined
with the state court decisions. See id. at 1163-65 (Rooker-Feldman bars de facto
appeals of a state court decision and constitutional claims “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court decision); see also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (a de facto appeal is one in which “the
adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the
district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court also dismissed Claims 1 and 2 on the grounds of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We affirm. To the extent the Reiner’s claims depended
on finding the California Supreme Court’s order suspending Reiner from the
practice of law under Claim 2 was invalid, Rooker-Feldman applies, as it is a de
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facto appeal of a state court’s adjudication. Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859. To the
extent that Reiner does not challenge the validity of the State Supreme Court’s
order of suspension, but focuses on ongoing proceeding in the State Bar Court,
Reiner’s request under claim 2 for injunctive relief against the State Bar Court and
various functionaries is subject to abstention under Younger v. Harris. 401 U.S. 37
(1971). All four requirements of Younger abstention apply. See Logan v. U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013). We note that in the context
of analyzing the Younger abstention requirements, the Supreme Court has said that
states have “an extremely important interest in maintaining and assuring the
professional conduct of the attorneys [they] license[].” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 434 (1982). Finally, to the extent
that Claim 2 could be construed as a request for a writ of mandamus, we affirm the
dismissal on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant
mandamus relief against state officers. See Demos v. U.S. Dist. Court for E.
District of Wa., 925 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1991).
We also affirm the dismissal of Claim 1 on Younger abstention grounds.
While the process regarding the sanctions in Claim 1 is not ongoing, voiding the
sanctions issued by the Workers Compensation Appeals Board would have the
same effect as voiding the State Bar Court proceedings.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Claim 3, Reiner’s state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343, 350 n.7 (1988) (where all federal claims are eliminated before trial, courts
generally should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state
law claims); Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2004)
(standard of review).
Reiner’s motions, filed on September 23, 2014, October 23, 2014, October
29, 2014, December 9, 2014, February 2, 2015, February 24, 2015, March 2, 2015,
March 17, 2015, March 30, 2015, April 3, 2015, April 21, 2015, May 4, 2015, and
May 14, 2015 are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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