Hassan Abpikar v. Eric Holder, Jr.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 05 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
HASSAN ABPIKAR, AKA John Abpikar No. 09-73384
Petitioner, Agency No. A026-361-799
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 16, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM, District
Judge.**
A. Introduction
Hassan Abpikar, a native and citizen of Iran, petitions for review of the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of his appeal. The Board affirmed the
immigration judge’s determinations that Abpikar was removable under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(A) and that Abpikar was ineligible for asylum and withholding of
removal. The Board also affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of Abpikar’s
application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252, and we grant the petition in part and dismiss in part.
B. Removal proceedings were proper.
Abpikar argues that the immigration court and the BIA lacked jurisdiction
because criminal charges against him were pending in federal court. But Abpikar
does not cite any authority, and we know of none, to support his claim. Abpikar’s
argument that removal proceedings were precluded by the doctrine of res judicata
also fails. Abpikar bases his res judicata challenge on an order from the
immigration court terminating prior removal proceedings without prejudice. The
removal proceedings in this case were not precluded by that order because “a
dismissal without prejudice is not a decision on the merits for purposes of res
judicata.” Oscar v. Alaska Dep’t of Educ., 541 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
C. The immigration judge and the BIA properly considered Abpikar’s
1980 conviction.
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Abpikar advances several arguments that the immigration judge and the BIA
erred by considering his 1980 conviction for telephoning a bomb threat.1 First,
Abpikar argues that this conviction is not actually a conviction within the meaning
of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) because his sentence was suspended. This argument
is unpersuasive. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (“Any reference to a term of
imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the
period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any
suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
Abpikar also argues that his conviction was not proved because the
immigration judge stated, “I think it’s a conviction,” at the May 26, 2009
cancellation hearing. This argument fails because the record reveals that the
immigration court relied on documentary evidence of Abpikar’s conviction.
Finally, Abpikar mounts several challenges to the validity of his conviction
and argues that he did not have an opportunity to advance those arguments before
the immigration judge. But Abpikar’s lawyer did dispute the validity of the
1
Because the BIA did not rely on Abpikar’s conviction for petty theft,
we need not reach Abpikar’s argument that the immigration judge impermissibly
considered that conviction. See Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.
2004) (per curiam) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the
grounds relied upon by that agency.”).
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conviction, and, in any case, “a conviction cannot be collaterally attacked in a
deportation proceeding.” Urbina-Mauricio v. INS, 989 F.2d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir.
1993); see also Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 995–97 (9th Cir. 2011).
D. Abpikar was not deprived of his right to counsel.
Abpikar argues that the immigration judge never informed him of his
statutory right to counsel. But the record shows that Abpikar affirmatively waived
his right to proceed with an attorney.
E. The immigration judge did not violate Abpikar’s due process rights.
Abpikar maintains that his due process rights were violated when the
immigration court remarked that Abpikar could resolve pending federal criminal
charges by pleading guilty to them. Abpikar has not demonstrated that the court’s
comment rendered the proceeding “so fundamentally unfair that [he] was
prevented from reasonably presenting his case,” Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967,
971 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), nor has he demonstrated
that the comment affected the outcome of the proceeding, Reyes-Melendez v. INS,
342 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003). Consequently there was no due process
violation.
F. Whether Abpikar’s conviction was for a crime of moral turpitude
The immigration judge determinated that Abpikar was removable pursuant
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to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) because he had been convicted of telephoning a bomb
threat, which it determined was a crime of moral turpitude that rendered him
inadmissible at the time his status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident. The
Board affirmed the immigration judge’s determination after concluding that the
offense necessarily involves threats of physical violence that are made “willfully
and maliciously.” Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1767.1(A)(7) (1971)). Abpikar argues that
the BIA erred. We agree with Abpikar.
In order to determine whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude,
this court applies the categorical and modified categorical approaches described in
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). See Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678
F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276,
2285 (2013). Once the elements of the offense of conviction are established, those
elements are compared to the generic definition of “crime involving moral
turpitude.” See Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). The
generic definition of “crime involving moral turpitude” is a crime involving “either
fraud or base, vile, and depraved conduct that shocks the public conscience.”
Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted).
Section 1767.1(A)(7) is not an offense involving fraud. “Non-fraudulent
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[crimes involving moral turpitude] almost always involve an intent to harm
someone.” Saavedra-Figueroa v. Holder, 625 F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because § 1767.1(A)(7) does not require proof
of attendant physical harm or intent to harm, a violation of § 1767.1(A)(7) does not
categorically constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. We therefore remand
the case for determination of whether Abpikar’s particular offense involved moral
turpitude under the modified categorical approach.
G. Whether Abpikar’s conviction was for a particularly serious crime
The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s determination that Abpikar was
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because telephoning a bomb
threat was a “particularly serious crime.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii),
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). We review the BIA’s determination that an alien was convicted
of a “particularly serious crime” for abuse of discretion. Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d
379, 385 (9th Cir. 2012). Whether a crime is a particularly serious crime generally
depends on “‘the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts
of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether the
type and circumstance of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the
community.’” Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(quoting In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982)).
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Relying solely on the elements of the crime, the BIA determined that,
because the Oklahoma statute under which Abpikar was convicted includes a
“willful” and “malicious” intent requirement, Abpikar potentially committed a
crime that was “particularly serious” on its face. The BIA then concluded that
Abpikar had failed to meet his burden of establishing facts that would preclude
such a designation in his case. But in Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338,
1346–47 (9th Cir. 2013), this court held that the BIA may not “create additional
categories of facially particularly serious crimes.”2 Under Blandino-Medina, the
BIA may not rely solely on the elements of the crime to determine whether a crime
is potentially a serious one and thus whether grounds for denial of withholding of
removal and asylum may apply. Id. at 1348. Further, the Board erred by failing to
consider Abpikar’s arguments that his crime was not particularly serious. We
therefore remand for a determination of whether Abpikar’s conviction was for a
particularly serious crime in light of the Frentescu factors.
H. Cancellation of removal
Abpikar challenges the denial of his application for cancellation of removal,
arguing that the immigration court erroneously determined that he has not been
2
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) enumerates only a single category of per
se “particularly serious crimes”—aggravated felonies for which an alien has been
sentenced to at least five years’ imprisonment.
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rehabilitated. We do not have jurisdiction to review a discretionary rehabilitation
determination. See Mejia v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2007); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). This claim must be dismissed.
We GRANT Abpikar’s petition in part and DISMISS in part. We
VACATE the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision and REMAND to the
Board of Immigration Appeals for reconsideration consistent with this disposition.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
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