Christina Sajor-Reeder v. J. Cavazos

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAY 27 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTINA SAJOR-REEDER, No. 14-55021
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-05701 VAP
(FFM)
v.
J. CAVAZOS, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 5, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: LIPEZ,** WARDLAW, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Christina Sajor-Reeder appeals the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 petition for habeas relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291 and 2253(a). Because the last-reasoned decision of the state court, that of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, Senior Circuit Judge for the First
Circuit, sitting by designation.
the California Court of Appeal for the Second District, was neither contrary to, nor
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, we
affirm. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100–02
(2011).
1. The only certified issue is whether the state court reasonably determined
that sufficient evidence of implied malice supported Sajor-Reeder’s second-degree
murder conviction. Under California law, malice may be implied from committing
“an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life;” with knowing
endangerment of others’ lives; and deliberate action with “conscious disregard for
life.” People v. Nieto Benitez, 840 P.2d 969, 975 (Cal. 1992).
First, the California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that a jury could
have found that Sajor-Reeder committed an “act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life.” Id. The state court reasonably determined that Sajor-
Reeder drove her car more than fifty miles per hour on residential streets, without
watching the road and while screaming and waving her right hand in the air.
Further, when Sajor-Reeder approached the intersection where the victim’s car was
stopped at a red light, she did not stop or slow down and violently crashed into the
victim’s car, killing the passenger and seriously injuring the driver.
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Second, the California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that a jury
could have found that Sajor-Reeder knew her actions endangered the lives of
others. The court reasonably relied upon Sajor-Reeder’s trial testimony that she
knew speeding and driving through red lights was dangerous to human life, and the
fact that four years prior to the charged incident Sajor-Reeder was involved in a car
chase where she evaded police, drove through several red lights, and nearly
collided with multiple vehicles. After the chase she was told by an officer that she
had put others’ lives in danger. As the Court of Appeal reasonably concluded, the
jury could have inferred that this prior reckless driving incident “sensitize[d]
[Sajor-Reeder] to the dangerousness of such life-threatening conduct.” People v.
Ortiz, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
Third, the California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that a jury could
have found that Sajor-Reeder acted “deliberately” and with “conscious disregard
for life.” Nieto Benitez, 840 P.2d at 975, 977–78. Sajor-Reeder knew that reckless
driving was life threatening from her prior misconduct and, as the Court of Appeal
reasoned, a jury could find that her persistence in that behavior evidenced a
“wanton disregard for human life.” Ortiz, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. In addition,
the record reflected Sajor-Reeder’s lack of interest in the fate of the passengers
after the accident, and a continued effort to harm her child. The California Court
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of Appeal also reasonably determined that record evidence, including the
testimony of her own expert, Dr. Hirsch, supported the conclusion that Sajor-
Reeder’s manic symptoms did not prevent her from being conscious of her actions.
2. We decline to expand the certificate of appealability to include Sajor-
Reeder’s uncertified claim that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Sajor-Reeder has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1002 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2)).
AFFIRMED.
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