Jose Martinez v. Superior Linen

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 17 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE PABLO MARTINEZ, a.k.a. Jase No. 13-71950
Martinez,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
SUPERIOR LINEN,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer
Submitted June 12, 2014**
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jose Pablo Martinez petitions pro se for review of a final order of an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in the Office of the Chief Administrative
Hearing Officer dismissing Martinez’s complaint alleging unfair immigration-
related employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Immigration
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324b(i)(1). We review de novo the ALJ’s conclusions of law and for
substantial evidence the ALJ’s findings of fact. Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d
561, 565 (9th Cir. 1989). We deny the petition for review.
The ALJ correctly granted a summary decision as to Martinez’s claims of
discriminatory and retaliatory discharge because Martinez failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact regarding whether Superior Linen’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory, and nonretaliatory reasons for discharging him were pretextual
and whether a causal link existed between his protected activity and his subsequent
discharge. See Villegas-Valenzuela v. INS, 103 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 1996)
(setting forth the standard for summary decision); see also Vasquez v. County of
Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]ndividuals are similarly
situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.”); Knickerbocker
v. City of Stockton, 81 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n inference [of
retaliation based on the timing of adverse action] is not compelled where other
evidence provides a reasonable basis for inferring that adverse action was not
retaliatory.”).
We construe Martinez’s Motion to Dismiss the Respondent’s Answering
Brief as a motion to strike the answering brief, and we deny the motion because
2 13-71950
Superior Linen filed its answering brief in accordance with the applicable rules.
Cf. 9th Cir. R. 28-1(a).
We deny as procedurally improper Superior Linen’s request for attorneys’
fees and costs, set forth in its opposition to Martinez’s motion. See 9th Cir. R. 39-
1.6.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3 13-71950