Rachel Jernigan v. Pamela Elliott

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 29 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RACHEL JERNIGAN, No. 12-15286
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02332-GMS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PAMELA ELLIOTT, FKA Pamela Brock;
RANDY MCLAWS,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
DAVID LANDGRAF; TOWN OF
GILBERT; UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Defendants.
RACHEL JERNIGAN, No. 12-15429
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02332-GMS
v.
PAMELA ELLIOTT, FKA Pamela Brock;
RANDY MCLAWS,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Defendants - Appellants,
and
DAVID LANDGRAF; TOWN OF
GILBERT; UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 17, 2014
San Francisco, California
Before: TALLMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and GARBIS, Senior
District Judge.**
Pamela Elliott (Brock)1 and Randy McLaws (McLaws) appeal the district
court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity by way of
an interlocutory appeal. See Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).
**
The Honorable Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge for the District
of Maryland, sitting by designation.
1
During the relevant time period, Brock was known as Pamela Brock. The
district court’s Order and parties’ briefs refer to her as Pamela Brock. For
consistency, this disposition will also refer to her as Pamela Brock.
2
“The threshold question in determining whether an official is entitled to
qualified immunity is whether the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to
[Jernigan] show that the conduct violated a constitutional right.” Tennison v. City
& Cnty. of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended
(citation and footnote reference omitted).
To succeed on her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jernigan “must show that
[Brock and McLaws] acted with deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for
[her] rights or for the truth in withholding evidence from prosecutors.” Id. at 1088.
An officer who is not “subjectively aware” of the underlying facts upon which
liability is predicated “cannot be said [to have] acted with deliberate indifference.”
Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1248 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations
and footnote reference omitted). Even taking all facts and inferences in Jernigan’s
favor, the record is insufficient to demonstrate that Brock and McLaws were aware
of Jernigan’s arrest during the relevant time period. Without this knowledge,
neither Brock nor McLaws could have been deliberately indifferent. See id.Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment in favor
of Brock and McLaws on qualified immunity grounds and remand for entry of
judgment in their favor.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
3