Melodie Kleiman v. Wells Fargo & Company

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 29 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MELODIE M. KLEIMAN, No. 11-56535
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-03628-VBF-
VBK
v.
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY; NDEX, MEMORANDUM*
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Valerie Baker Fairbank, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2014**
Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Melodie M. Kleiman, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing her action arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to
state a claim, Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2001), and we affirm.
The district court did not err by considering the motion to dismiss brought
by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., despite the complaint naming Wells Fargo &
Company, because documents which were properly subject to judicial notice show
that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., not Wells Fargo & Company, was the real party in
interest as the loan holder. See id. (when ruling on a motion to dismiss, district
court need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to
judicial notice”); Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.
1988) (district court may “take judicial notice of matters of public record outside
the pleadings and consider them for purposes of the motion to dismiss” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, we reject Kleiman’s contention that
the district court violated her due process rights by allowing pleadings to be filed
by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Kleinman’s contentions regarding the denial of default judgment and a
prove-up hearing are unpersuasive.
We do not consider allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
2 11-56535