Darryl Farris v. Stuart Ryan

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 21 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARRYL WAYNE FARRIS, No. 09-15835
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:04-cv-00989-LKK-
EFB
v.
STUART RYAN, Acting Warden, MEMORANDUM *
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 30, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: B. FLETCHER, TALLMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Darryl Wayne Farris (Farris) challenges the district court’s denial
of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Farris contends that the exclusion of
evidence of prostitution pursuant to California’s Rape Shield Law violated his
rights under the Confrontation Clause.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Because Farris’s habeas petition was filed after 1996, his claim is governed
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See
Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 2010). Under the AEDPA, Farris’s
petition can only be granted if the state court’s “adjudication of the claim resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.” Id. (citations and alteration omitted).
The California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court, pursuant to
California’s Rape Shield Law, properly excluded a victim’s prior conviction for
prostitution and her “price list”. This conclusion was not contrary to Michigan v.
Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that a
defendant does not have an unconditional constitutional right to introduce evidence
of a prior sexual relationship with the victim, and the legitimate interests served by
state rape shield statutes could justify excluding such evidence.
Consistent with Lucas, the trial court balanced the probative value of the
evidence against its prejudicial nature. See id. at 153 (remanding for consideration
of whether the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated “on the facts”).
Indeed, Farris was allowed to ask all three victims whether they were engaged in
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prostitution on the nights in question. He also identified one location as a “stroll
area” for prostitutes.
AFFIRMED.
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