IMAN JONES v. LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 14 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IMAN JONES, ) No. 12-15903
)
Plaintiff - Appellant, ) D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01874-LRH-RJJ
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM*
)
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN )
POLICE DEPARTMENT; )
GARN CROSSMAN; DANIEL )
ROSEQUIST; JOSHUA GIESE, )
)
Defendants - Appellees. )
)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 4, 2013**
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, FERNANDEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Iman Jones appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
of Officer Garn Crossman and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD). We affirm.
All of Jones’ claims on appeal rest on his assertion that his rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated because Officer
Crossman arrested him without probable cause. We disagree with that assertion.
We have carefully reviewed the record and agree with the district court that
on the facts presented probable cause existed because “under the totality of
circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have
concluded that there was a fair probability that [Jones] had committed a crime.”
Conner v. Heiman, 672 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc); Peng v. Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2003). There was more
than sufficient corroboration for the victim-witness’ assertion that Jones had
pointed a firearm at him, including the discovery of a gun under the seat of Jones’s
truck that matched the description of the victim-witness. See Peng, 335 F.3d at
978–79; Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1444–45 (9th Cir. 1991). Because
there was no violation of Jones’ constitutional rights, Officer Crossman was
entitled to qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability at the first step of
the required analysis. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S. Ct. 808,
2
815–16, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). Similarly, absent a constitutional violation,
LVMPD did not incur § 1983 liability1 for the officer’s actions.2 Finally, because
Jones’ remaining claims also rest on his assertion that his arrest was unlawful, they
also fail.
AFFIRMED.
1
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 98 S. Ct. 2018,
2035–36, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).
2
Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc); Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1414–15 (9th Cir. 1986).
3