Luis Gonzalez v. Jefferson Sessions

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUIS GONZALEZ, AKA Luis Armando No. 15-73292
Gonzalez, AKA Luis Armondo Gonzalez,
Agency No. A205-717-446
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 8, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and SETTLE,*** District Judge.
1. The Board if Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) explained its reasons for
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial with sufficient clarity. See
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Antonyan v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 2011). The BIA affirmed the
IJ’s denial in part because the IJ “did not clearly err in finding that [Gonzalez] did
not show a reasonable probability that he would lack access to appropriate
medications in Mexico[,]” based on expert declarations indicating that similar
medications are on Mexico’s basic list of psychiatric medications. The BIA was
not required to do more – it need not explicitly address the IJ’s string-of-events
analysis.
2. The IJ denied Gonzalez’s asylum application in part based on a finding
that Gonzalez’s argument that he would be unable to obtain the medication he
needs to treat his bipolar disorder was not substantiated. On review, the BIA
concurred with the IJ’s analysis, but cited further evidence to support the
conclusion that Gonzalez did not show a reasonable possibility that he would lack
access to appropriate medications in Mexico. Governing regulations state that the
BIA shall not “engage in de novo review of findings of fact determined by an
immigration judge.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i); see also Ridore v. Holder, 696
F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2012). In citing expert declarations, the BIA was simply
discussing further evidence to support the IJ’s conclusion. Accordingly, though
the BIA cited different evidence than the IJ did, the BIA did not engage in
improper additional fact-finding.
3. Gonzalez’s evidence does not compel the conclusion that he will be
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persecuted in Mexico on account of his mental illness. Asylum claims cannot be
based on unduly speculative fears of future persecution. See, e.g., Nahrvani v.
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, given the “very
deferential” substantial evidence standard of review, we will not disturb the BIA’s
denial of Gonzalez’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal. Garcia v.
Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014).
4. Gonzalez’s speculative fear that he will be subjected to deplorable
conditions in a Mexican mental institution or prison if he is deported does not
satisfy the standard for relief under the Convention Against Torture because he
provided no evidence that he will be specifically targeted for torture. See Villegas
v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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