Jonathan Knotts v. Ray Carreira

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 18 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JONATHAN KNOTTS, No. 11-16870
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:09-cv-04851-JF
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RAY CARREIRA, a Santa Clara Police
Officer; STEVEN ERNST, a Santa Clara
Police Officer; JOHN DOES, Santa Clara
Police Officers, the identities and exact
number of whom unknown to plaintiff at
this time; CITY OF SANTA CLARA,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeremy D. Fogel, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 14, 2013**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, McKEOWN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Jonathan Knotts appeals from the district court’s summary judgment on his
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law arising out of the search of his
vehicle and his arrest for possessing an illegal weapon. The district court
concluded that qualified and state statutory immunities protected the police officers
and the City of Santa Clara. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we
affirm.
I. Claims under § 1983
Qualified immunity must be decided “as a matter of law when the material,
historical facts are not in dispute, and the only disputes involve what inferences
properly may be drawn from those historical facts.” Conner v. Heiman, 672 F.3d
1126, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The question is “whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the
circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation
of the events can be constructed.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (per
curiam).
The material, historical facts of Knotts’s encounter with police are not in
dispute; because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not repeat them here.
Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed
Knotts’s consent to the search was valid. The officers therefore are entitled to
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qualified immunity with regard to the search. See Burrell v. McIlroy, 464 F.3d
853, 859 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding detectives were entitled to qualified immunity
where reasonable officer would not have been on notice that consent obtained was
involuntary).
The manifold that officers discovered in the course of searching Knotts’s
vehicle closely resembled a billy club, an illegal weapon under California law.
Cal. Penal Code § 12020 (repealed 2012); see also Cal. Penal Code § 22210. The
officers understandably believed it was likely an illegal weapon, particularly in the
context of the threat they were investigating. Before arresting him, the officers did
not act unreasonably in declining to verify Knotts’s explanation that the manifold
was an example of his work as a machinist. “Once probable cause to arrest
someone is established . . . a law enforcement officer is not required by the
Constitution to investigate independently” a suspect’s asserted defenses. Broam v.
Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Because the officers reasonably believed they had probable cause to
arrest Knotts for possessing an illegal weapon, they are entitled to qualified
immunity.
The City of Santa Clara may be held liable only if it “has adopted an
illegal or unconstitutional policy or custom” that resulted in a violation of Knotts’s
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constitutional rights. Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
Because Knotts did not argue or show that the City has any such policy or custom,
we affirm summary judgment in favor of the City on the § 1983 claim.
II. Claims under California law
Knotts brought common law claims for false imprisonment, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and assault and battery, and brought a
claim under California Civil Code § 52.1 (“Bane Act”). The officers and the City
assert various state statutory immunities. Summary judgment on the state claims is
proper “where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ogborn v. City of Lancaster, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 238, 243 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c)).
Because the officers, “at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the
arrest was lawful,” they are immune from liability for false imprisonment and from
Bane Act liability premised on false arrest and imprisonment. Cal. Penal Code
§ 847(b)(1). The officers are immune from liability for the remaining common law
claims because they exercised due care in the search and arrest, which were
reasonable acts of law enforcement. Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.4. Under California
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law, the City shares the immunity of the police officers. Id. § 815.2(b); see also
Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1016.
AFFIRMED.
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