Madhavi Pullela v. Intel

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 24 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MADHAVI PULLELA, No. 10-35716
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-1427-AC
v.
INTEL CORPORATION, MEMORANDUM *
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ancer L. Haggerty, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 13, 2012 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,
District Judge***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
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Madhavi Pullela appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Intel Corporation on her wrongful discharge claim. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the
facts of this case, we restate them here only as necessary to explain our decision.
Pullela presents two issues on appeal. First, she argues the district court
erred when it concluded that she did not believe, in good faith, that she was
reporting sexual discrimination when she reported her co-worker’s flirtatious
behavior and preferential treatment. Second, Pullela contends the district court
erred when it concluded that she had failed to establish a causal connection
between her complaint and her discharge. We review both of these claims de novo.
Degelmann v. Advanced Med. Optics, Inc., 659 F.3d 835, 839 (9th Cir. 2011).
I.
Under Oregon law, a plaintiff is wrongfully discharged if she is fired or
constructively discharged for (1) fulfilling an important public or societal
obligation or (2) for exercising an employment-related right of important public
interest. Lamson v. Crater Lake Motors, Inc., 216 P.3d 852, 856 (Or. 2009) (en
banc) (citing Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 681 P.2d 114 (Or. 1984)). Reporting
sexual discrimination qualifies as an employment-related right of public
importance. Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1299–1300 (Or.
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1984) (en banc).
When, as here, a plaintiff fails to report actionable discrimination, the
plaintiff may nonetheless bring a wrongful discharge claim if she had a good-faith
belief that she was reporting actionable discrimination. Bahri v. Home Depot USA,
Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 922, 954 (D. Or. 2002) (citing McQuary v. Bel Air
Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21, 23–24 (1984)). The district court correctly
concluded that Pullela did not have a good-faith belief that she was reporting
sexual discrimination.
While Pullela was not required to know the finer points of the law governing
sexual discrimination when she made her complaint, Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982,
985 (9th Cir. 1994), both this Court and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission have long recognized that sexual favoritism alone does not amount to
sexual discrimination. Candelore v. Clark Cnty. Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588,
590 (9th Cir. 1992).
In short, Pullela has not shown that she had a good-faith belief that she was
reporting sexual discrimination when she reported the flirtatious behavior and
preferential treatment.
II.
The fact that Pullela’s complaint was not a protected activity is a sufficient
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reason to affirm the district court. But, even if Pullela had engaged in a protected
activity, she has not shown a “causal connection” between that activity and her
discharge. Estes v. Lewis & Clark College, 954 P.2d 792, 796–97 (Or. App. 1998)
(citing Shockey v. City of Portland, 837 P.2d 505 (Or. 1992)). In order to make this
showing, Pullela must show that her activity was a “substantial factor” that “made
a difference in the discharge decision.” Howard v. Milwaukie Convalescent Hosp.,
Inc., 2008 WL 4117167, at *7 (D. Or. Aug. 25, 2008) (citing Estes, 954 P.2d at
796–97). We have reviewed the events that Pullela asserts constitute the requisite
causal connection and hold that the district court did not err in concluding that
Pulella failed to establish such a connection.
The district court correctly concluded that Pullela did not engage in a
protected activity when she made her complaint. But even if she had, Pullela has
not established a causal connection between her complaint and her discharge.
AFFIRMED.
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