Department of Education v. Karen I. Ex Rel. Marcus I.

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 03 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, No. 09-15988
STATE OF HAWAII,
DC No. 08 CV-0255 SOM
Plaintiff - Appellee, D. Hawaii
v.
MEMORANDUM *
KAREN I., in her capacity as parent and
legal guardian of Marcus I.,
Defendant - Appellant.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
STATE OF HAWAII,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-17608
v. DC No. 08 CV-0255 SOM
D. Hawaii
KAREN I., in her capacity as parent and
legal guardian of Marcus I.,
Defendant - Appellant.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Susan Oki Mollway, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 17, 2011
Honolulu, Hawaii
Submission Vacated February 23, 2011
Resubmitted May 16, 2011
Before: TASHIMA, W. FLETCHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Karen I. challenges the district court’s determination that the State
of Hawaii’s Department of Education (“DOE”) was not obligated to pay for her
son Marcus I.’s residential placement for the 2006-07 school year. The district
court had jurisdiction under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
1. The court reviews de novo the question of whether a school district’s
proposed individualized education program (“IEP”) provides a free appropriate
public education (“FAPE”). Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307,
1310 (9th Cir.1987). De novo review also applies to a district court’s ruling that a
claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion. Stewart v. U. S.
Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002).
2
We look to Hawaii law to determine whether the state court judgment has
preclusive effect on the DOE’s subsequent appeal in federal court. Albano v.
Norwest Fin. Hawaii, Inc., 244 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001). “It is settled law
in Hawaii that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new
action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same
subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the issues which were
actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim and defense
which might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or
decided.” Quality Sheet Metal Co. v. Woods, 627 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Haw. Ct. App.
1981). At issue here is whether the claims asserted in both actions are the same.
Albano, 244 F.3d at 1064.
“To determine whether a litigant is asserting the same claim in a second
action, the court must look to whether the ‘claim’ asserted in the second action
arises out of the same transaction, or series of connected transactions, as the
‘claim’ asserted in the first action.” Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 795 P.2d 276, 279
(Haw. 1990) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)). The claim
must be viewed “in factual terms . . . coterminous with the transaction regardless of
the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those
theories, that may be available to the plaintiff . . . .” Id. n.6. If the claim now
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asserted “could have been raised in the earlier state court action,” the claims are the
same for the purposes of Hawaii res judicata analysis. See Pedrina v. Chun, 97
F.3d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir. 1996).
Here, Karen I. raised two related issues in separate requests for an impartial
due process hearing. The first issue is whether the DOE was required to pay for
Marcus’ 2006-07 residential placement under the parties’ settlement agreement.
The second issue is whether the DOE wrongfully refused to put a residential
placement in Marcus’ 2006-07 IEP. Karen I. argues that the state court decided
only the first issue, leaving the second issue for the hearing officer to determine in
the first instance. Even if the two issues are distinct, they effectively form the
same claim because they arise out of the same transaction or series of connected
transactions. Karen I. wanted the DOE to pay for Marcus’ residential placement
because she believed it was a “necessary component” of his educational program.
She had two theories for pressing this point: (1) payment was required under the
terms of the settlement agreement, and (2) a residential placement was necessary to
provide a FAPE (and thus should have been in the IEP). These theories are
different grounds for reaching the same outcome: that the DOE accept financial
responsibility for Marcus’ 2006-07 residential placement. See Quality Sheet Metal
Co., 627 P.2d at 1130 (explaining that res judicata “precludes the relitigation . . . of
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all grounds of claim and defense which might have been properly litigated in the
first action but were not litigated or decided.”).
Accordingly, the state court judgment bars the ultimate remedy sought by
Karen I. We sympathize with Karen I.’s argument that the state court’s orders
were unclear. However, the state court ruled as a matter of law that the DOE was
not obligated to pay for Marcus’ residential placement for the 2006-07 school year.
We are bound by that ruling. See Gov’t of Guam v. Cruz (In re Gov’t of Guam),
869 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that res judicata applies “even if
the court in the first litigation was wrong in its determinations”).1
2. We review a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees for abuse of
discretion. Parent V.S. ex rel. Student A.O. v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union
High Sch. Dist., 484 F.3d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 2007). Where we review “rulings
of the district court regarding local practice and local rules, the appropriate
standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Guam Sasaki Corp. v. Diana’s, Inc.,
881 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1989).
1
Because IEPs must be reevaluated at least annually, the state court’s
decision does not exert preclusive effect on adjustments to Marcus’ IEP in
subsequent school years, including determinations whether residential placement is
required in order to provide a FAPE. See Haw. Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n,
827 F.2d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that income tax claims in
successive tax years, or rate claims in successive rate proceedings, are not the same
claim for res judicata purposes).
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Here, the district court denied Karen I.’s initial motion for attorneys’ fees for
failure to comply with Local Rule 54.3(b). The district court clearly instructed
Karen I. that careful compliance with Local Rule 54.3(b) was necessary. It gave
her a second opportunity to bring her motion and file the required statement of
consultation. Karen I. did not timely file the statement, and presents no compelling
excuse for the failure to comply. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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