Peng Liu v. Holder

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 01 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PENG LIU, No. 06-70421
Petitioner, Agency No. A075-665-996
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 13, 2011 **
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, SKOPIL, and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Peng Liu petitions pro se for review of a decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of Liu’s applications for
asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Liu has also asked both the BIA and this
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
court to remand his case so that he can apply for adjustment of status based on his
2005 marriage to a U.S. citizen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We
deny the petition.
The facts of this case are known to the parties. We do not repeat them.
We review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal
conclusions de novo. See Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2009).
To qualify for asylum, Liu must show that he “is unable or unwilling to
return to” China “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A); 1158(b)(1)(A). “To be well-
founded, an asylum applicant’s fear of persecution must be both subjectively
genuine and objectively reasonable.” Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Liu has failed to
establish a well-founded fear of persecution. Liu’s false statements to the asylum
officer under oath and his submission of false documents to the immigration court
undermine the credibility of his asylum claim. See Martinez v. Holder, 557 F.3d
1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an applicant’s false statements to an
asylum officer under oath supported an adverse credibility finding); Desta v.
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Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that submission of false
documents that went to the heart of the petitioner’s claim supported an adverse
credibility finding). If an applicant fails “to present candid, credible and sincere
testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution,” he cannot “satisfy the
subjective component of the well-founded fear standard” for asylum. Mejia-Paiz
v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 724 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, even if Liu’s fear of religious persecution is genuine, substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that this fear is not objectively reasonable.
Liu has not been persecuted in the past, and the evidence of possible future
persecution is too general and too speculative. See Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d
1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting a “general, undifferentiated claim”
of future persecution); see also Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060-62 (9th
Cir. 2009) (discussing examples of systematic persecution that have given rise to a
pattern or practice claim in prior cases and concluding that the petitioner failed to
establish a pattern or practice of persecution of Chinese Christians in Indonesia).
The same reasoning supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal.
See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the
standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum).
Substantial evidence also supports the denial of Liu’s CAT claim because the
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general evidence Liu presented does not compel a finding that there is a “greater
than fifty percent” chance that Liu will be tortured if he returns to China. See
Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 2004).
Liu asks us to remand to the BIA so that he can seek to adjust his status
based on his marriage to a United States citizen. He also asked the BIA to remand
for the same reason. He did not, however, file a motion to reopen or remand. He
did not submit “the appropriate application for relief and all supporting
documentation.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey,
538 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the “formal requirements of a motion
to remand and a motion to reopen are the same” and such motions must be
“accompanied by the proper application for relief and all supporting
documentation”). Given these circumstances, we decline Liu’s request for a
remand.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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