Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDWARD L. DAVIS, No. 10-35627
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-06352-PK
v.
MEMORANDUM *
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ancer L. Haggerty, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 17, 2012 **
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Alan Stuart Graf, the attorney of record for Edward L. Davis and the real-
party-in-interest, appeals from the district court’s judgment granting in part his
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) based on a contingent-fee
agreement with Davis. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
for an abuse of discretion, Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009)
(en banc), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the fees from the
amount specified in the fee agreement based on the court’s assessment of what was
reasonable given the risk and complexity involved in this case and the effective
hourly rate yielded by the award of fees. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,
808 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of
time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is . . . in order,” and that
the court may consider the hours spent and the normal billing rate); Crawford, 586
F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk
involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general,
when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue,
529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it
does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous
finding of fact.”).
AFFIRMED.
2 10-35627