Curt Read v. Raymond Lahood

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 23 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CURT M. READ, an individual, No. 10-36138
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00154-MJP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RAYMOND LaHOOD,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 12, 2012**
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,
District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, U.S. District Judge for the District
of Montana, sitting by designation.
Appellant Curt M. Read (Read), an employee of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of appellee Raymond LaHood, Secretary of Transportation. Read argues that
he was discriminated against based on his race, age and/or gender in five selection
processes between 2005 and 2008. Read also contends that he was the victim of
unlawful retaliation.
1. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Read has not
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to his discrimination claims. See Dawson
v. Entek. Intern., 630 F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir. 2011). In each of the selection
processes, the record supports the FAA’s articulated “legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason” for the agency’s promotion decisions. Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615
F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Importantly, Read has not
shown that there exists “a triable issue of pretext” as to any of the selection
processes. Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).
2. Read similarly failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his
retaliation claims. See Dawson, 630 F.3d at 934. Read’s “[u]nsubstantiated
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assertions of retaliatory intent, without more, are insufficient to overcome the
[FAA’s] proffered neutral reasons.” Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted). “[I]n the light of the timing and the surrounding
circumstances” of each selection process, Anthoine v. N. Cent. Ctys. Consortium,
605 F.3d 740, 751 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), Read has not raised a genuine
issue of material fact “that engaging in the protected activity was one of the
reasons [he was not selected] and that but for such activity he would [have been
selected].” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir.
2002) (citation and alteration omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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