United States v. Christopher Halbert

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 09 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-50164
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 5:08-cr-00159-VAP
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CHRISTOPHER WAYNE HALBERT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 6, 2012 **
Before: B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Christopher Wayne Halbert appeals from the 120-month sentence imposed
following his guilty-plea conviction for possession of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Halbert first contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
appreciate its discretion to vary from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range on
policy grounds, and by failing to explain why it rejected his policy arguments. The
record belies these contentions. The court considered Halbert’s arguments and
explained the sentence sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate review. See
United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States
v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts are not
obligated to vary from the child pornography Guidelines on policy grounds if they
do not have, in fact, a policy disagreement with them.”).
Halbert next contends that the district court erred by imposing a vulnerable
victim adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), because the adjustment should
not apply in a possession of child pornography case. His contention is foreclosed
by United States v. Lynn, 636 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011).
Halbert finally contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We
consider policy arguments like Halbert’s within the context of the reasonableness
of the final sentence. See United States v. Barsumyan, 517 F.3d 1154, 1158-59
(9th Cir. 2008). The record reflects that Halbert’s sentence is substantively
reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
AFFIRMED.
2 10-50164