DocketNumber: 10-10081
Citation Numbers: 472 F. App'x 437
Judges: Wallace, Nelson, Bea
Filed Date: 3/16/2012
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 16 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-10081 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00110-JMR-1 v. MEMORANDUM* CESAR JIMENEZ-LOPEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 13, 2012** San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE, D.W. NELSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges. Cesar Jimenez-Lopez appeals from his conviction, by guilty plea before a magistrate judge, of entry without inspection in violation of8 U.S.C. § 1325
. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Jimenez-Lopez claims that his December 7, 2009 group plea hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. Although Jimenez-Lopez preferred to render his guilty plea pursuant to an individualized plea hearing rather than as part of a group plea proceeding, he voluntarily agreed to participate in the group proceeding so that he could make his plea and return to Mexico that same day rather than remain in custody while he waited for an individualized hearing. Requiring Jimenez-Lopez to choose between resolving his case immediately as part of a group and resolving it later in an individualized hearing did not violate due process. See Brady v. United States,397 U.S. 742
, 751 (1970); see generally United States v. Kaczynski,239 F.3d 1108
, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[In criminal proceedings,] being forced to choose between unpleasant alternatives is not unconstitutional.”). In addition, the magistrate judge did not violate Jimenez-Lopez’s due process rights by accepting his guilty plea because the record contains “affirmative evidence that [Jimenez-Lopez] entered his plea knowingly and willfully.” See United States v. Diaz-Ramirez,646 F.3d 653
, 658 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Boykin v. Alabama,395 U.S. 238
, 243 n.5 (1969) (“[I]f a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.”); United States v. Escamilla-Rojas,640 F.3d 1055
, 1062 2 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he right to due process does not impose strict requirements on the mechanics of plea proceedings. Rather, the right simply requires the record to ‘disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.’”) (quoting Brady,397 U.S. at
747 n.4). AFFIRMED. 3