Jose Rodriguez v. K. Pearson

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE GARCIA RODRIGUEZ, No. 11-16306
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:09-cv-01746-SKO
v.
MEMORANDUM *
K. PEARSON, Lieutenant; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Sheila K. Oberto, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **
Submitted May 15, 2012 ***
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jose Garcia Rodriguez, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** Rodriguez consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
process claims arising from his placement and continuing confinement in
disciplinary segregation and the security housing unit (“SHU”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rodriguez’s due process claims
because Rodriguez failed to allege facts showing how placement in disciplinary
segregation or the SHU imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 486 (1995) (disciplinary confinement does “not present the type of atypical,
significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty
interest”); see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“[A]dministrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily
contemplated by a sentence.”); Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315
(9th Cir. 1995) (“no liberty interest in remaining in the general population” of
prison). Moreover, even if we were to assume that the length of time Rodriguez
was placed in SHU implicated a liberty interest, the allegations in and attachments
to the complaint indicate that Rodriguez received all the process he was due. See
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228-29 (2005) (notice and opportunity to be
heard, involving informal, nonadversarial procedures were adequate safeguards for
2 11-16306
placement in maximum custody).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the amended
complaint with prejudice, after having granted Rodriguez leave to amend once and
instructing him on the deficiencies in the complaint. See Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co.,
292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the district court’s discretion is
particularly broad when it has already granted leave to amend).
Rodriguez’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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