United States v. Chadwick Holden

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 01 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-30175
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2-06-cr-00281-RSM-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CHADWICK HOLDEN, AKA Chase,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 13, 2012
Seattle, Washington
Before: HUG, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Chadwick Holden appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised
release. He argues that the district court’s admission of hearsay testimony at his
revocation hearing violated his due process rights, the district court improperly
admitted statements he made to the police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
U.S. 436 (1966), and there was insufficient evidence to revoke his supervised
release. The facts underlying this case are known to the parties and need not be
repeated here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo whether the district court violated Holden’s due process
rights. United States v. Perez, 526 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2008). We review a
district court’s decision to revoke a term of supervised release for abuse of
discretion. Perez, 526 F.3d at 547.
The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does not apply in supervised
release revocation hearings, United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir.
2005); and hearsay may be admissible, see United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166,
1170 (9th Cir. 1999). However, Holden has a “due process right to confront
witnesses against him during his supervised release proceedings, . . . unless the
government shows good cause for not producing the witnesses.” Hall, 419 F.3d at
986 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Holden challenges the district court’s admission of out-of-court statements
by Mathis and Barnett. Holden’s interest in confrontation does not outweigh the
government’s good cause for denying it. See id. at 986-88. The government in
this case provided a good reason for not producing Mathis and Barnett—both
witnesses expressed fear of retaliation from the commencement of their
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involvement in the case and both witnesses recanted their testimony as the prospect
of further involvement increased. See id. at 988. Additionally, Mathis’ and
Barnett’s statements bore indicia of reliability because they were consistent with
each other and with Mathis’ injuries. See id. Further, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by finding that the challenged statements fall under the excited
utterance hearsay exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2); see also Hall, 419 F.3d at
987 (“[L]ong-standing exceptions to the hearsay rule that meet the more
demanding requirements for criminal prosecutions should satisfy the lesser
standard of due process accorded the respondent in a revocation proceeding.”).
Holden’s Miranda argument also fails. Even assuming arguendo that the
district court erred in admitting Holden’s pre-Miranda statement, the error was
harmless because Holden’s post-Miranda statements alone fully supported the
district court’s finding. See United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017,
1031-32 (9th Cir. 2010). Because Holden’s due process and Miranda arguments
fail, Holden’s sufficiency of the evidence argument fails as well. See Perez, 526
F.3d at 547.
AFFIRMED.
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