United States v. Curtis Eder

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 27 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-30345
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00097-SEH
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CURTIS RAY EDER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 17, 2012 **
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Curtis Ray Eder appeals from the 365-month sentence imposed following
his jury-trial conviction for second-degree murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1153(a) and 1111, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 113(a)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291, and we affirm.
Eder first contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
grant a two-point downward adjustment to his offense level for acceptance of
responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. In light of the record before it, the district
court did not clearly err by denying the adjustment. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5;
United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2004).
Eder next contends that the district court erred by applying a two-level
vulnerable victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). Given the district
court’s finding that the victim was in a prone position when he was attacked, the
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the enhancement. See United States
v. Weischedel, 201 F.3d 1250, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court did not
otherwise procedurally err. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
Eder finally contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. In
light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing
factors, the sentence is substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
AFFIRMED.
2 11-30345