Toddella Brown v. Homestreet Bank

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 12 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TODDELLA D. BROWN, No. 19-56132
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
5:18-cv-02379-JGB-SHK
v.
HOMESTREET BANK; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JOHN DOE, 1,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 9, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: OWENS, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Toddella D. Brown appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of her
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
wrongful foreclosure action against HomeStreet Bank, Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), Government National Mortgage Association
(“Ginnie Mae”), and Zieve, Brodnax, & Steele, LLP. We review de novo a district
court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Robinson v.
United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying de novo review to
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction); Perez v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d
334, 337 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying de novo review to dismissal for failure to state a
claim). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to deem
certain matters admitted because Brown’s requests for admissions were premature.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1), 36(a)(3); see also Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d
616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying abuse of discretion standard of review).
2. The district court properly dismissed Brown’s claims against Ginnie
Mae because it enjoys sovereign immunity from suit for injunctive and declaratory
relief, and Brown failed to state a claim for any other relief against Ginnie Mae.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a); Cal. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 19,
23–24 (1990) (explaining that only a party with a direct contractual relationship
with the United States has standing to bring a breach claim under the Tucker Act).
3. The district court retained subject matter jurisdiction after it dismissed
Brown’s federal claims. It did not abuse its discretion in exercising supplemental
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jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See
Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991).
4. The district court properly dismissed Brown’s claims under the Truth
in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act as time-barred
under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) and 12 U.S.C. § 2614. Brown was not entitled to
equitable tolling because her allegations pertained to disclosures made at
origination of the loan, and thus her later discovery of alleged defects in the
assignment of the deed of trust is irrelevant to the timeliness of her claims. Hinton
v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The burden of alleging facts
which would give rise to tolling falls upon the plaintiff.”). The district court
properly dismissed Brown’s claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as
untimely because Brown did not plead sufficient facts supporting application of the
discovery rule. See Lyons v. Michael & Assocs., 824 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.
2016).
5. Brown failed to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure under
California law because her allegations pertained to whether the assignments of the
deed of trust were voidable, rather than void, and she therefore lacked standing to
challenge the assignments. See Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 365 P.3d
845, 860–61 (Cal. 2016) (explaining that a borrower must allege a defect that
renders the loan or assignment void, not merely voidable, to have standing to
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challenge a party’s authority to foreclose); Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (holding a borrower lacks
standing to challenge the validity of “robo-signatures,” which would make an
assignment voidable, not void); Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 138
Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining a party need “not possess
the original promissory note” to foreclose).
6. The district court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing
claims based on Brown’s failure to respond to the arguments in Defendants’
motions to dismiss. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for
dismissal.”); C.D. Cal. R. 7-12.
7. The district court properly dismissed Brown’s claim under
California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act on the ground that
Brown’s allegations were conclusory and did not meet the federal pleading
standard. See Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2021)
(discussing federal pleading requirements).
8. Brown failed to state a claim for conversion, quantum meruit, breach
of fiduciary duty, or unfair competition. See Foster v. Sexton, 276 Cal. Rptr. 3d
172, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (stating elements of conversion); In re De Laurentiis
Entm’t Grp., Inc., 963 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1992) (defining quantum meruit);
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IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi, 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (stating
elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim).
9. The district court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing
without leave to amend. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 655–56
(9th Cir. 2017).
10. Brown’s motions for certification, validation, and expedition are
denied. (Dkts. 14, 52, 57.) Brown’s motion for an extension of time to file a reply
brief is granted. (Dkt. 56.) The Clerk shall file the reply brief submitted at
Docket 54.
AFFIRMED.
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