Anderson Thurston v. James Yates

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 07 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANDERSON P. THURSTON, No. 10-16142
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02280-LKK-
GGH
v.
JAMES YATES, MEMORANDUM *
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 1, 2011
San Francisco, California
Before: FISHER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and MILLS, Senior District
Judge.**
Appellant Anderson Thurston (Thurston) challenges the district court’s
dismissal of his habeas petition as untimely. Thurston contends that he was
entitled to additional equitable tolling.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Richard Mills, Senior District Judge for the United
States District Court for Central Illinois, sitting by designation.
1. The state’s argument that Thurston’s federal habeas petition is
procedurally barred was not raised in the district court. Rather than determining
whether the state’s reason for failing to raise procedural default meets the
extraordinary circumstances standard, we review Thurston’s claims on the merits.
See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. Thurston agrees with the district court’s grant of equitable tolling for the
period between August 9, 2006 and June 30, 2008. However, Thurston argues that
the district court erred in not granting equitable tolling between June 30, 2008 and
September 23, 2008.
A habeas petitioner is eligible for equitable tolling when he diligently
pursues his federal rights, and is nevertheless incapable of filing a timely federal
habeas petition because of extraordinary circumstances. See Lakey v. Hickman,
633 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2011), as amended. Additionally, there must be a
causal link between the extraordinary circumstances and the inability to file a
timely petition. See id. at 786. The diligence required for equitable tolling does
not have to be maximum feasible diligence, but rather reasonable diligence. See
Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010). An appellant may be entitled to
equitable tolling during a period when the appellant has no access to his legal files,
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and such deprivation made it impossible to timely file the appellant’s habeas
petition. See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2009).
The magistrate judge found that Thurston was not diligent in filing his
federal habeas petition because at the point he learned that his state supreme court
habeas petition had been denied, he filed a petition for rehearing in the state court
rather than filing a federal habeas petition. Unfortunately, Thurston’s attempt to
preserve his federal claims by filing in state court does not warrant equitable
tolling. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 & n.3 (9th Cir.
2009). Moreover, ignorance of the law does not warrant equitable tolling. See
Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986).
That Thurston was in administrative segregation for thirty-two days with no
access to his legal files does not change the outcome. Even allowing for these
thirty-two days, there remains a gap of fifty-three days. Therefore, the district
court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, because Thurston’s
habeas petition was barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
AFFIRMED.
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