Trenton v. Attorney General for Arizona

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 01 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH AMAZIAH TRENTON, a.k.a. No. 09-15377
Clinton Joseph Slone,
D.C. No. 3:05-cv-03362-MHM
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM *
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF ARIZONA; CHARLES L.
RYAN,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Mary H. Murguia, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 10, 2010 **
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Amaziah Trenton appeals pro se from the district court’s orders
dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition and denying his motion for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
On remand from this Court, the district court dismissed as moot Trenton’s
habeas petition, which challenged the original calculation of his parole eligibility
date. Trenton contends the district court erred by dismissing the petition and
denying his subsequent motion for reconsideration because the Arizona
Department of Corrections’ subsequent recalculation of his release dates was also
incorrect. However, the recalculated release dates are not the subject of Trenton’s
section 2254 petition or his original appeal. The issue of whether the recalculated
release dates were erroneously calculated therefore has no bearing on whether the
district court properly dismissed the petition.
The rule of mandate required the district court to dismiss the petition
because this Court had determined that the only timely issue raised in the petition,
whether the original parole-eligibility date was miscalculated, was moot. See
United States v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2007) (“‘a district court
could not refuse to dismiss a case when the mandate required it’”) (quoting United
States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178, 181 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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We construe Trenton’s additional arguments as a motion to expand the
certificate of appealability. So construed, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R.
22-1(e); see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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