Olaree Hoppel v. Premera Blue Cross

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 03 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OLAREE E. HOPPEL, No. 11-35546
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01686-RAJ
v.
MEMORANDUM *
PREMERA BLUE CROSS,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2012 **
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Olaree E. Hoppel appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her action for joint and survivor annuity benefits and insurance benefits under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), as amended by
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the Retirement Equity Act of 1984. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo, Gilliam v. Nev. Power Co., 488 F.3d 1189, 1192 n.3 (9th Cir.
2007), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hoppel
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant provided
any life insurance policy to her late ex-husband and whether defendant’s contract
to pay him certain retirement income from its operating budget constituted a
qualified plan subject to § 1055’s surviving spouse provisions. See 29 U.S.C. §
1055 (stating that certain pension plans must be provided in the form of a qualified
joint and survivor annuity benefit); id. § 1051(2) (excluding from § 1055 a pension
plan that is unfunded and maintained by an employer to provide deferred
compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated
employees); see also Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir.
1996 (“[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for
purposes of summary judgment.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hoppel’s motion
for reconsideration or relief from judgment because Hoppel failed to establish
grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS,
Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and
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discussing factors for reconsideration or relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) and 60(b)).
Hoppel’s arguments that the district court allegedly violated or ignored the
terms of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order issued in her divorce proceedings,
rejected evidence of fraud in a prior litigation, or failed to apply Mack v.
Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2010), are not supported by the record.
AFFIRMED.
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