United States v. Wyvonia Ware

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 19 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 08-50529
Plaintiff-Appellee, Dist. Ct. No. 2:07-cr-01379-SVW
v.
WYVONIA WARE, MEMORANDUM *
Defendant-Appellent.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 7, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: FISHER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and STROM, District Judge.**
Wyvonia Ware was indicted on three counts of knowingly and willfully
understating her income to the Department of Housing of Urban Development
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, Senior United States District
Judge for the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
(“HUD”) in order to obtain federal low-income housing benefits from the Section 8
Housing Choice Voucher Program (“Section 8 program”) in 2003, 2004, and 2005,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The Housing Authority of Los Angeles
(“Housing Authority”) locally administers the Section 8 program, and Ware’s false
statements were made on income certification forms she submitted to the Housing
Authority. A jury found Ware guilty of all three counts.
A crime is committed under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 when someone, “in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive . . . branch of the Government of the United
States, knowingly and willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation.” 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); see also United
States v. Atalig, 502 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating the government must
prove (1) a statement, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) knowledge, and (5)
jurisdiction to obtain a conviction under § 1001).
On appeal, Ware raises four assignments of error, none of which were raised
before the district court. Because Ware failed to raise these issues before the
district court, this court reviews them for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
First, Ware argues the district court committed plain error in failing to find there
was insufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury of § 1001’s jurisdiction
element. Under the plain error standard, “[t]he court would be reluctant to sustain
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a conviction if it could be clearly seen from the record that the evidence was
insufficient.” United States v. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir.
2000). When determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, the
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must
affirm if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1161
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
A false statement is made within the executive branch’s jurisdiction when
the executive branch “has the power to exercise authority in a particular situation.”
See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984); United States v. Facchini,
874 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). This court has previously recognized
that when there is a direct relation between a false statement and the payment of
federal benefits, jurisdiction is satisfied. Atalig, 502 F.3d at 1068; Facchini, 874
F.2d at 643. In this case, the jury heard evidence that HUD is responsible for
funding the Section 8 program and sets all the regulations and standards for the
Section 8 program. Moreover, many of the Section 8 program income certification
forms that Ware completed, which the government offered into evidence,
contained explicit warnings to applicants that false statements made on the forms
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constituted a crime under § 1001. When viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Ware’s false
statements in her income certification forms to the Housing Authority were made
in a matter within HUD’s jurisdiction.
Second, Ware argues the district court committed plain error when it failed
to find insufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Ware’s false
statements were material. A false statement “is material if it has a natural tendency
to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the [agency] to which it
was addressed.” Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Facchini, 874 F.2d at 643 (“A statement is
considered material if it has the propensity to influence agency action.”). The
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution demonstrates that
Ware’s false statements regarding her income were material because Section 8
program benefits are calculated using the amount of income an applicant discloses.
An applicant’s failure to accurately disclose income will affect the computation of
Section 8 program benefits and may result in an overpayment of benefits.
Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Ware’s false statements were
material.
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Third, Ware argues the district court committed plain error when it gave a
jury instruction regarding § 1001’s jurisdiction element. Even assuming, without
deciding, that the district court erred when it instructed the jury, the error was not
“so clear-cut, so obvious, a competent district judge should be able to avoid it
without benefit of objection.” United States v. Wahid, 614 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th
Cir. 2010). Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error.
Finally, Ware argues the district court committed plain error by violating her
rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause, when prior to opening statements the
district court dismissed a sworn juror for health reasons and reconvened the venire
panel to select a replacement juror rather than using the alternate juror. Although
jeopardy attached to Ware when the jury was initially sworn, this original jeopardy
did not terminate with the sworn juror’s dismissal. See United States v. Trigg, 988
F.2d 1008, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S.
317, 325 (1984)). Since Ware’s original jeopardy never terminated, she was not
put in jeopardy more than once and the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated.
AFFIRMED.
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