United States v. Matthew Browne

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 05 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-30042
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
9:16-cr-00027-DLC-1
v.
MATTHEW DESMOND BROWNE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2018
Seattle, Washington
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Matthew Browne appeals the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless search of
his vehicle. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
A district court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo. United
States v. Gorman, 859 F.3d 706, 714 (9th Cir. 2017). “We review de novo whether
the police had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, a mixed
question of law and fact.” United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th
Cir. 2006). The district court’s underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear
error. Id. We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Id.
1. Holzer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop because he
witnessed Browne speeding. See id. (“A traffic violation alone is sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion.”).
2. Scofield was justified in prolonging the traffic stop because he had
reasonable suspicion that Browne was trafficking narcotics. The anonymous tip
that formed the basis of Scofield’s reasonable suspicion exhibited “sufficient
indicia of reliability.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). Scofield and
Holzer were able to corroborate many of the details of the anonymous tip. The
officers corroborated the make, model, color, and country of registration of the
vehicle described in the tip. We find especially compelling the additional
corroboration of the name of the driver. “It is true that not every detail mentioned
by the tipster was verified.” Id. at 331. However, we conclude under the totality
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of the circumstances that the anonymous tip exhibited sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify Scofield’s prolongation of the traffic stop.1
Further, by calling multiple K-9 units shortly after speaking with Browne,
Scofield “diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or
dispel [his] suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
[Browne].” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). Although it took
between forty-five minutes and an hour for the K-9 unit to arrive, this delay did not
“unreasonably infringe[] interests protected by the Constitution.” Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); see also Gallegos v. City of L.A., 308 F.3d
987, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2002) (forty-five to sixty minute detention not
unreasonable).
3. Browne’s reliance on United States v. Magallon-Lopez, 817 F.3d 671
(9th Cir. 2016), is misplaced. Browne was in fact told the true basis for why he
was stopped and why the stop was prolonged, so we need not address his claim of
1
We note that there were discrepancies between Detective Scofield’s
testimony and the bodycam and audio recordings of the traffic stop. Those
discrepancies do not alter our determination that other corroboration provided
objectively reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop, but we are nonetheless
concerned that the record does not support many of the details included in the
detective’s testimony.
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a due process right “to be informed of the true basis for a stop or arrest.”
Magallon-Lopez, 817 F.3d at 677 (Berzon, J., concurring).
AFFIRMED.
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