Lorena Meyer v. Dolly Matteneucci

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 19 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LORENA MEYER, No. 12-17065
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-00734-WHA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DOLLY MATTENEUCCI; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 13, 2014**
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Lorena Meyer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her employment action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2010), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Meyer’s action because Meyer failed to
allege facts sufficient to support one or more elements of her claims. See id. at
341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382
F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or
unreasonable inferences need not be accepted as true); see also, e.g., Pinnacle
Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 716 (9th Cir. 2011) (elements of due
process claim); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir.
2005) (elements of equal protection claim); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington,
51 F.3d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1995) (elements of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim); Miller v.
Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (no individual liability
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d
1089, 1113-14 (Cal. 2000) (elements of discrimination claim under California’s
Fair Employment and Housing Act).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Meyer’s motion for
leave to amend because Meyer failed to cure the defects in her due process and
equal protection claims, failed to allege sufficient facts in support of her proposed
Title VII retaliation claim, and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from
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pursuing her proposed First Amendment claim. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v.
EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of
review, and noting that district court does not abuse its discretion by denying leave
to amend where amendment would be futile); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles,
349 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2004) (elements of prima facie case of retaliation under
Title VII); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting
forth elements of the doctrine of res judicata, which bars re-litigation of claims
adjudicated on the merits in a prior action).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Meyer’s motions
for reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(a) and 60(b) because
Meyer failed to establish grounds for such relief. See Garamendi v. Henin, 683
F.3d 1069, 1077-80 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth standard of review and factors
warranting reconsideration under Rule 60(a)); Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty.,
Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and factors warranting reconsideration under Rule 60(b)).
We do not address issues raised for the first time in Meyer’s reply brief. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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