United States v. Kimberly Hernandez

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 15 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-50461
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:16-cr-00504-JFW-1
v.
KIMBERLY ANN HERNANDEZ, AKA MEMORANDUM*
Ramona Vigil,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 9, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: TASHIMA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and SIMON,** District Judge.
Kimberly Ann Hernandez (“Hernandez”) appeals her jury convictions for
conspiracy to commit bank fraud; bank fraud and attempted bank fraud; conspiracy
to steal mail and to possess stolen mail; and possession of stolen mail. Hernandez
raises two issues on appeal, relating to the admission of certain evidence and the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the
District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her conviction for conspiracy to commit bank
fraud. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
First, Hernandez argues that the court erred in admitting evidence relating to
her theft of a purse. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2009).
The district court admitted this evidence after concluding that it was
“inextricably intertwined” with the charged offenses of possession of stolen mail
and conspiracy to steal mail. As this Court has previously explained:
We have recognized two categories of evidence that may
be considered “inextricably intertwined” with a charged
offense and therefore admitted without regard to
Rule 404(b). First, evidence of prior acts may be
admitted if the evidence constitutes a part of the
transaction that serves as the basis for the criminal
charge. Second, prior act evidence may be admitted when
it was necessary to do so in order to permit the prosecutor
to offer a coherent and comprehensible story regarding
the commission of the crime.
United States v. DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that evidence of Hernandez’s theft of the purse was inextricably
intertwined with the charged offenses. Although Hernandez admitted driving her
passengers to the community mailbox, she denied getting out of the car. Her
admitted theft of the purse and the fact that a credit card from the purse was found
in the gutter near the community mailbox several hours later is circumstantial,
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albeit not dispositive, evidence that Hernandez did not remain in the car as she
claims. Also, the fact that Hernandez stole the purse and that the contents of the
purse’s wallet were strewn throughout Hernandez’s car is relevant to show a
common plan by the alleged co-conspirators. It allows the reasonable inference
that the individuals who took part in the mail theft intended to share the proceeds
of that theft, just as they had apparently agreed to share the proceeds of
Hernandez’s theft of the purse.
Hernandez also objected that the evidence of her theft of the purse should
have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the probative value of this
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
Second, Hernandez argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to
sustain her conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud. We review a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence by asking “whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” McFall, 558 F.3d
at 955 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
To prove conspiracy, the government generally must establish: “(1) an
agreement to engage in criminal activity, (2) one or more overt acts taken to
implement the agreement, and (3) the requisite intent to commit the substantive
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crime.” United States v. Grasso, 724 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted). The government also must prove that the defendant had a “knowing
connection . . . with the conspiracy.” Id. (quoting United States v. Meyers, 847
F.2d 1403, 1413 (9th Cir. 1988)). “The government may rely on circumstantial
evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence in order to prove [a] defendant’s
knowing connection to the conspiracy.” Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, shortly
before her arrest, Hernandez attempted to negotiate a check that she knew had been
stolen. Also, at the time of her arrest, she was in possession of another stolen
check. Further, two of her co-defendants had fraudulently negotiated checks. This
is sufficient to establish a modus operandi of Hernandez and her co-defendants.
Further, on the same evening as the mail theft, Hernandez stole a purse at the
urging of her passengers, and the contents of the purse, which could be used to
commit bank fraud, were strewn throughout the car along with the stolen mail.
This is circumstantial evidence that the four defendants intended to share the
profits of the crimes carried out that evening, and a rational jury could conclude
that they shared a common goal of stealing mail and using the contents of that mail
to commit bank fraud, just as they had apparently agreed to share the proceeds of
Hernandez’s theft of a purse. There is sufficient evidence of the crime of
conspiracy to commit bank fraud to sustain the jury’s verdict.
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AFFIRMED.
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