Michael Steel v. Charles Ryan

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 08 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL STEEL, No. 09-16531
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01030-PGR
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CHARLES L. RYAN; et al.,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Paul G. Rosenblatt, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 17, 2011
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, GOULD, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Michael Steel appeals from the district court’s judgment, dismissing Steel’s
habeas petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we
affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Steel contends that the statute of limitations period for his habeas petition
should have been equitably tolled based on new evidence of mental impairment
and, thus, that his petition was timely filed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a person in custody has one year from
when his state court judgment became final to file an application for a writ of
habeas corpus. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because his state judgment became final on
June 9, 2005, Steel had until June 9, 2006, to file his federal habeas petition, unless
it was equitably tolled.
A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations
if he shows (1) “‘that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,’” and (2) “‘that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.’” Holland v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
The extraordinary circumstance must have been beyond the petitioner’s control and
must have made it impossible to file the petition on time. See Roy v. Lampert, 465
F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006).
Under Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010), a petitioner must first
show that his mental impairment was an extraordinary circumstance beyond his
control and that it was so severe that either the “petitioner was unable rationally or
factually to personally understand the need to timely file” or “unable personally to
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prepare a habeas petition.” Id. at 1099–1100. Second, a petitioner must show that
he was diligent in pursuing the claims, but that it was impossible under the totality
of the circumstances to do so because of his mental impairment. Id.In this case, the district court found that Steel “has not shown extraordinary
circumstances beyond his control which made it impossible for him to timely file.”
Steel alleges only that “[n]either the district court nor the magistrate judge in this
case applied the proper legal standard in determining whether Steel was eligible for
equitable tolling.” Although he alleges that his mental incompetence was an
extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling, Steel fails to demonstrate
either that his mental incompetence is severe or that it was the cause of his delay in
filing. Steel’s principal evidence consisted only of inconclusive grade-school and
middle-school reports from 1968, 1970, and 1973. Therefore, Steel is not entitled
to equitable tolling based solely on his allegations.
Steel’s second claim is that his allegation of mental retardation warranted an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether equitable tolling applied. A habeas
petitioner “should receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes a good-faith
allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.” Roy, 465 F.3d at
969 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, even if Steel’s allegations
were true, they would be insufficient to show that he was entitled to equitable
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tolling because of “a severe mental impairment during the filing period.” See Bills,
628 F.3d at 1100 (emphasis added). Steel made no claim regarding his mental
state at the time of his guilty plea or his conviction. He also failed to allege a
causal link between his claimed mental incompetence and the delay in filing his
federal habeas petition. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Steel an evidentiary hearing.
AFFIRMED.
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