Maryann Celedon v. Andrew Saul

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 11 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARYANN CELEDON, No. 17-16979
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00440-JLT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Jennifer L. Thurston, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 9, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges
Maryann Celedon appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
XVI of the Social Security Act. At step four of the sequential evaluation process,
the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Celedon could perform her past
relevant work as a switchboard operator. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review a district court’s decision not to apply the law of the case
doctrine for abuse of discretion and whether an ALJ has followed the remand order
of the district court in compliance with the rule of mandate de novo, Stacy v.
Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the law of
the case doctrine. The district court remanded the ALJ’s initial decision because
the record was not fully developed, and the ALJ on remand properly developed the
record by eliciting additional vocational expert testimony and accepting additional
medical evidence in order to clarify Celedon’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). See id. at 567 (stating that the law of the case doctrine should not be
applied “when the evidence on remand is substantially different.”).
The district court did not err in concluding that the ALJ did not violate the
rule of mandate with respect to the ALJ’s reformulation of Celedon’s RFC because
the district court’s remand order did not preclude the ALJ from reformulating
Celedon’s RFC. See id. at 568-69 (stating that an ALJ may “reexamine any issue
on remand that is not foreclosed by the mandate.”).
AFFIRMED.
2 17-16979