United States v. Stephen Washington, Jr.

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 30 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10102
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cr-50016-ROS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STEPHEN O’NEAL WASHINGTON, Jr.,
a.k.a. Steven O’Neal Washington, Jr.,
a.k.a. Steven O’Neal Washington,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Howard D. McKibben, District Judge, Presiding**
Submitted September 23, 2014***
Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Stephen O’neal Washington, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Howard D. McKibben, United States District Judge
for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
revoking supervised release and challenges the 10-month custodial sentence, 36-
month term of supervised release, and a special condition of supervised release
imposed upon revocation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Washington contends that the district court erred by failing to explain the
sentence adequately and to address his nonfrivolous arguments for a non-
Guidelines sentence. We review for plain error, see United States v. Hammons,
558 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009), and find none. See United States v. Carty,
520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (adequate explanation may be inferred
from the record as a whole).
Washington also challenges a special condition of supervised release. His
challenge is only to the written order, which prohibits him “from making major
purchases, incurring new financial obligations, or entering into financial contracts
without the prior approval of the probation officer.” Washington argues that this
condition is unconstitutionally vague and insufficiently related to the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d) sentencing factors. Because it is not clear from the order which
transactions are subject to the condition, the condition is impermissibly vague. See
United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (conditions of
supervised release must be “sufficiently clear to inform [defendant] of what
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conduct will result in his being returned to prison”). We, therefore, vacate special
supervised release condition #4. We remand for the district court to reenter
judgment without this condition or to hold a resentencing at which the court may
reimpose the condition more narrowly. If the court reimposes the condition, it
shall state with greater particularity which purchases, financial obligations, and
financial contracts are covered by the condition and why the condition is necessary
in this case.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED.
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