James v. Woodford

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 04 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TIMOTHY A. JAMES, No. 08-55216
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:06-cv-02882-AHM-E
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JEANNE WOODFORD, ROBERT
AYERS, JR., and CHARLES M.
HARRISON,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
A. Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 3, 2009
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, SILER, and IKUTA,** Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit
Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Timothy A. James appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus
petition. He argues that an extra jury instruction on simple malice prejudiced his
conviction for second-degree murder.
In 2003, James shot and killed Robert Rodela near the Pico-Union area
apartment complex where James lived. He was convicted of second-degree
murder. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and held that the
trial court’s use of an extra jury instruction on simple malice was harmless error.
The California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review. James
then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court
denied on the ground that it was absolutely certain that the jury did not convict him
of second-degree murder based on the extra instruction.
The only issue in this appeal is whether James was prejudiced by the extra
jury instruction on malice. James is not entitled to relief unless “[he] can establish
that the error resulted in actual prejudice.” Ho v. Carey, 332 F.3d 587, 595 (9th
Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). We assess the “prejudicial impact of
constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial” under the “substantial and
injurious effect” standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 122 (2007). The Brecht standard requires reversal only
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if, but for the error, there is “a reasonable probability” that the jury would have
reached a different result. Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 916 (9th Cir. 2006).
Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude that James did not
suffer prejudice, because the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on
his trial. In short, if the extra malice instruction had not been given, it is not
“reasonabl[y] probab[le]” that the jury would have reached a different result. See
Clark, 450 F.3d at 916. The evidence supported a finding of malice aforethought,
which was properly defined in the jury instructions. First, the evidence showed
that James acted intentionally when he discharged the gun (the first element of
implied malice). James himself never argued that he shot Rodela accidentally;
instead, he relied on self defense to justify his actions. To support the second
element of implied malice, that the natural consequence of James’s act was
dangerous to human life, the jury heard evidence that James shot Rodela at close
range and that the shots were fatal. Finally, the foregoing evidence supported the
final element of implied malice, that the act was deliberately and knowingly
performed with a conscious disregard for human life. Because the evidence
supports a finding of second-degree murder—namely, that James unlawfully killed
Rodela with malice aforethought—and not voluntary manslaughter, there was no
prejudice. Moreover, the erroneous instruction did not prevent the jury from
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finding imperfect self-defense, because the relevant jury instruction, CALJIC No.
8.50, stated that imperfect self-defense negates a finding of “malice,” however that
term may be defined.
In its 2007 review of the state court’s determination, the district court
applied the absolute certainty standard, reaching its decision before the Supreme
Court’s clarification in Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 129 S. Ct. 530, 533 (2008), that our
circuit’s prior “absolute certainty standard . . . [was] plainly inconsistent with
Brecht.” Id. Thus, even though the district court applied the absolute certainty
standard, its decision to do so was in James’s favor, given that it applied a more
stringent standard of review than that announced in Pulido.
AFFIRMED.
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