United States v. Leodis Roach

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-30075
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00096-RHW-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
LEODIS R. ROACH,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 6, 2013
Seattle, Washington
Before: FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant United States challenges the suppression of evidence discovered
by Washington State troopers during the search of a vehicle stopped for driving in
the left-hand lane of Interstate 90 in the absence of traffic.
Section 46.61.100(2) of the Washington Revised Code provides:
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Upon all roadways having two or more lanes for traffic moving in the
same direction, all vehicles shall be driven in the right-hand lane then
available for traffic, except (a) when overtaking and passing another
vehicle proceeding in the same direction, (b) when traveling at a speed
greater than the traffic flow, (c) when moving left to allow traffic to
merge, or (d) when preparing for a left turn at an intersection, exit, or
into a private road or driveway when such left turn is legally
permitted.
Wash. Rev. Code. § 46.61.100(2); see also id. § 46.63.020 (providing that any
violation of a section in Title 46 of the Wash. Rev. Code is a traffic infraction).
Because there is no state court decision interpreting this statutory provision,
we must “predict how the highest state court would decide the issue.” Kekauoha-
Alisa v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. (In re Kekauoha-Alisa), 674 F.3d 1083, 1088
(9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Washington state courts begin statutory
interpretation with the plain meaning of the statute, as “discerned from the ordinary
meaning of the language at issue . . .” Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 243
P.3d 1283, 1288 (Wash. 2010) (en banc), as amended. Washington courts also give
effect to all the language of the statute. See id.Section 46.61.100(2) provides that a vehicle shall remain in the right-hand
lane then available for traffic unless the vehicle is passing another vehicle, moving
faster than the traffic flow, allowing traffic to merge, or preparing to make a left
turn. In most cases, Washington courts have interpreted “shall” as conveying a
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mandatory directive. See Singleton v. Frost, 742 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Wash. 1987)
(“Ordinarily, the use of the word shall in a statute carries with it the presumption
that it is used in the imperative rather than in the directory sense.”). We do not
agree with the district court that § 46.61.100(4)1 overrides the mandatory language
in § 46.61.100(2). Rather, we read the plain language of the statute as a whole to
mandate use of the right-hand lane then available for traffic except in four
specified circumstances, and to prohibit driving continuously in the left lane when
doing so impedes the flow of traffic. Consequently, in the state of Washington, it is
a traffic infraction to drive continuously in the left-hand lane of a two-lane divided
highway in the absence of traffic.
Accordingly, Officer Clark’s decision to stop the vehicle was based on
reasonable suspicion because he observed the driver driving continuously in the
left-hand lane of I-90 in violation of § 46.61.100. See United States v. Choudhry,
461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he decision to stop an automobile is
reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred. . . .”) (citations omitted). Because the stop was based on reasonable
suspicion that the driver was committing a traffic infraction, evidence discovered
1
Section 46.61.100(4) provides: “It is a traffic infraction to drive
continuously in the left lane of a multilane roadway when it impedes the flow of
other traffic.” Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.100(4).
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during the ensuing search was admissible in subsequent proceedings. See United
States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 2005).
REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this disposition.
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