Manuel Ramirez v. Escondido Union School Dist.

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 18 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANUEL A. RAMIREZ, individually and No. 14-55439
as Guardian ad Litem for ENRIQUE
RAMIREZ CANO, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01823-DMS-
BGS
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. MEMORANDUM*
ESCONDIDO UNION SCHOOL
DISTRICT, AKA Escondido Unified
School District; et al.,
Defendants - Appellants.
MANUEL A. RAMIREZ, individually and No. 14-55472
as Guardian ad Litem for ENRIQUE
RAMIREZ CANO, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01823-DMS-
BGS
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ESCONDIDO UNION SCHOOL
DISTRICT, AKA Escondido Unified
School District; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 10, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: MURPHY,** PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Escondido Union School District and the individual Defendants appeal the
district court’s partial denial of their post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of
law and for a new trial. On cross-appeal, Plaintiffs Manuel A. Ramirez and his
minor son, Enrique C., challenge the district court’s dismissal of their intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim. We review the district court’s post-trial
rulings de novo, and will uphold a jury’s verdict if supported by substantial
evidence. See A.D. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 452-53 (9th Cir. 2013);
Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (9th Cir.
2001). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
In December of 2010, staff at Farr Elementary School released Enrique to
Alejandro Rodriguez Ramos after Enrique’s mother called the school to authorize
the release. Ramos then took Enrique to Mexico to live with his mother, who had
**
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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been deported. Enrique’s father, Ramirez, sued Defendants for violating his
substantive due process rights, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The jury found in favor of Ramirez on all claims.
Defendants argue that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity
as to Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. We agree. The doctrine of qualified
immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). A grant of qualified immunity is appropriate where either 1) the
facts that a plaintiff has shown do not make out a violation of a constitutional right
or 2) the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged
misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Whether the law
placed a state actor on reasonable notice that her conduct would violate the
Constitution must be determined “in light of the specific context of the case, not as
a broad general proposition.” Jones v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 802 F.3d 990, 1004
(9th Cir. 2015).
We need not decide whether the evidence presented by Plaintiffs made out a
constitutional violation because even assuming that it does, the right at issue was
not clearly established at the time of Defendants’ conduct. The district court relied
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on Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009) and James v.
Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2010). Those cases, however, deal with limits
on government officials’ attempts to place minors in protective custody, a wholly
different context from the one at bar. Burke, 586 F.3d at 731-32 (discussing the
limits on government officials’ ability to take custody of children in imminent
danger); James, 606 F.3d at 654 (finding parent must be notified when officials
encourage and facilitate the transfer of a minor’s custody). Unlike in Burke and
James, Defendants here did not purposefully execute a transfer of custody, which
was in effect facilitated by the wrongful conduct of a third party. The school
district’s policy regarding emergency cards does not speak to the government-
initiated transfer of custody between parents and thus is unrelated to the rights at
issue in Burke and James. In light of the Supreme Court’s direction “not to define
clearly established law at a high level of generality,” we hold that Burke and James
did not place Defendants on notice that their actions violated Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084
(2011). We therefore conclude that qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs’
constitutional claims and all damages resulting therefrom.
We recognize that the jury’s differing damage awards were inconsistent
because each compensated Plaintiff Ramirez for the same harm. However, the
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district court determined that the $2 million damages award for negligence was
supported by substantial evidence presented to the jury. El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415
F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants do not challenge that finding on
appeal, and have not requested a retrial on damages. See Gallick v. Baltimore &
O.R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119-20. Instead, Defendants argue, without any
supporting authority, that they are entitled to the lower amount. Because we
reverse as to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim, Defendants’ argument that they are entitled
to the § 1983 damages award is moot.
We affirm the remainder of the district court’s post-trial rulings. The jury’s
finding that Defendants were negligent is supported by substantial evidence. See
Phyllis P. v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1193 (1986). We cannot say that as
a matter of law Defendants did not owe Ramirez a duty of care in light of the fact
that Defendants were on notice that Enrique’s mother had been removed to Mexico
and Ramirez requested to be contacted about matters regarding Enrique. Further,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by omitting a jury instruction on
superceding, intervening cause since the jury found that the school’s negligence
proximately caused the tortious result. See Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist.,
75 P.3d 30, 47 (2003) (holding that for an intervening act properly to be considered
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a superseding cause, “the act must have produced harm of a kind and degree far
beyond the risk that the original tortfeasor should have foreseen”).
Finally, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff Ramirez's intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim because he only advanced a reckless
disregard theory but failed to establish that he was present at the time of the
misconduct. See Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 201-02 (Cal. 1991).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.
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