Cezar Carvajal v. Pride Industries Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 12 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CEZAR CARVAJAL, No. 14-55914
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-02319-GPC-
MDD
v.
PRIDE INDUSTRIES INC. and DOES, 1- MEMORANDUM*
10,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 4, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: FISHER, M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Cezar Carvajal sued his former employer, Pride Industries, Inc., alleging that
Pride Industries failed to accommodate his knee injury and fired him in retaliation
for exercising his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Pride Industries and, following a bench trial, the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
district court also found in favor of Pride Industries on the equitable claim for
retaliation. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by formulating instructions
that asked the jury to consider the major life activities of both “working” and
“manual tasks.” A “disability” under the ADA is defined as a “physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102 (emphasis added). Here, the district court reasonably decided that both
instructions were necessary to avoid jury confusion, given Carvajal’s theory at trial
and the conflicting evidence regarding the extent of his work on ladders.1
Moreover, the verdict form made clear that Carvajal could meet his burden by
establishing a substantial limitation in either “working” or his ability to perform
“manual tasks” alone. See Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 913 (9th Cir. 2006) (in
the absence of specific evidence to the contrary, the court “presume[s] that juries
follow their instructions.”).
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding an investigative
report from the Department of Labor Office of Federal Contract Compliance
1
The parties agree that the 2008 ADA amendments – which became effective after
Carvajal’s employment with Pride ended – do not apply to this case.
2
Programs or the testimony of two employees responsible for preparing the report.
The report’s findings embraced many of the same ultimate issues that the jury was
asked to decide at trial, and the district court permissibly concluded that the report
was “overly prejudicial” and “basically takes away the jury’s role as fact finders.”
See Fed. R. Evid. 403; Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1500
(9th Cir. 1986) (“The probative value of a letter of violation may not, in every
case, outweigh the potential for prejudice.”). For the same reason, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding related testimony from the report’s
authors, or by refusing to allow Carvajal to back-door the report’s findings into
evidence through cross-examination of other witnesses.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding testimony from
Raquel Vazquez, a Pride Industries supervisor, regarding another manager’s
purported refusal to provide reasonable breaks or his alleged verbal abuse of
employees. Carvajal does not dispute that another former co-worker already
offered overlapping testimony on the same issues, and trial courts have
considerable latitude to exclude cumulative evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 127 (1974)).
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4. Finally, because there was no instructional error, the jury’s factual findings
did not lead to a Seventh Amendment violation during the bench trial on Carvajal’s
equitable claim for retaliation. Cf. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 885 F.2d 498,
507 (9th Cir. 1989).
AFFIRMED.
4