Kevin Mays v. Todd Stobie

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 20 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KEVIN MAYS, No. 11-35649
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00552-EJL-
CWD
v.
JODY MUNDELL; DUSTIN MEMORANDUM *
HIBBARRD; LEWISTON CITY OF,
IDAHO; JOHN DOES 1-V; DALE
BUTTREY; STEVE LUTES; JACK
MCGEE; RICK SMITH; GABE
RICHARDSON; JACLYN MARTIN;
JAMIE ROMER; JODY BROWN;
JACOB GUNTER,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 7, 2013
Seattle, Washington
Before: FISHER, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Mays appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendant deputies in Mays’s § 1983 deliberate indifference claim
against deputies of the Nez Perce County Jail.1 We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Toguchi v. Chung, 391
F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues
of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
substantive law.” Id. (quoting Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.
2004)). Although the Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners from cruel
and unusual punishment, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects
pretrial detainees, such as Mays, from mistreatment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535-37 & n.16 (1979). However, we apply the same Eighth Amendment
“deliberate indifference” standard to our Fourteenth Amendment analysis of the
1
In the same complaint, Mays brought a distinct excessive force claim
against several police officers. That claim went to trial and is not at issue in this
appeal. With respect to his deliberate indifference claim, Mays also named Nez
Perce County, Sheriff Dale Buttrey, and Lieutenant Jack McGee as defendants
under theories of municipal and supervisory liability. Mays does not appeal the
district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to those defendants. The
remaining defendants, Rick Smith, Gabe Richardson, Jaclyn Martin, Jamie Romer,
Jody Brown, and Jacob Gunter, are referred to collectively as the “deputies.”
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treatment of pretrial detainees. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232,
1244 (9th Cir. 2010).
It is well-established that prisoners have a right to adequate medical care.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But not every claim of inadequate
medical care states a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment, or, in the case
of pretrial detainees, the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 105. In order to establish a
constitutional violation, a prisoner must establish that an official acted with
“deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need[].” Id. at 104. Deliberate
indifference is a state of mind “more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). An official is only deliberately indifferent if
he is “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, . . . draw[s] the inference,” and fails to adequately
respond to that need. Id. at 837, 844.
Mays has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he had a serious medical
need. He has failed, however, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the
deputies responded to that medical need with deliberate indifference. To rise to the
level of a constitutional violation, an official’s response to a serious medical need
must be more than negligent. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. A prisoner must show that
the officials chose a course of conduct “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk
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to [the prisoner’s] health.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Jackson v.
McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Nothing in the record supports a finding that the
deputies responded to Mays’s condition with deliberate indifference. After Mays
exhibited symptoms of alcohol withdrawal, he was taken to the hospital where he
was observed and treated by a physician. The doctor authorized his return to the
county jail. Upon his return to jail, the deputies closely monitored Mays and, when
necessary, restrained him to prevent him from injuring himself. No reasonable trier
of fact could conclude that these actions by the deputies constituted deliberate
indifference.
AFFIRMED.
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