Yasuda v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 11 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TODD C. YASUDA, No. 10-17611
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01541-FJM
v.
MEMORANDUM *
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 15, 2012
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, FISHER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
The ALJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial
evidence in the record, including reports that Yasuda’s condition had improved
with medication and descriptions of activities of daily living indicating reasonable
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
functioning on a daily basis. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.
1995).
The ALJ did not err in relying on Dr. Fair’s and Dr. Gallucci’s translations
of Yasuda’s limitations (including the moderate limitations in areas of sustained
concentration and persistence identified by Dr. House) into concrete work
restrictions. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008).
Therefore, the ALJ did not err in determining that Yasuda had the residual
functional capacity to perform “simple, unskilled work,” nor was this
determination inconsistent with Dr. House’s findings. See id. Program Operations
Manual System Section DI 25020.010 is not to the contrary, as it provides
guidance with respect to more extensive limitations than those identified by the
relevant medical evidence.
AFFIRMED.
2
FILED
Yasuda v. Commissioner, NO. 10-17611 JUN 11 2012
THOMAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
I respectfully dissent. The ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment
limiting Yasuda to simple, unskilled work and occasional, superficial contact with
colleagues does not capture all of his moderate limitations and work restrictions as
identified by Dr. House. Specifically, the assessment did not take into
consideration Dr. House’s limitations relating to Yasuda’s difficulty: (1)
maintaining regular attendance with punctuality; (2) performing activities within a
schedule; (3) sustaining an ordinary routine without special supervision; (4)
working in coordination or proximity to others without being distracted by them;
or (5) completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychological symptoms.
These limitations were not included in the residual functional capacity
assessment or in the hypothetical posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert. A
vocational expert’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence only if the
hypothetical question posed considers “all of the claimant’s limitations.” Andrews
v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 1995). Because the hypothetical question
was flawed, reversal is required.
An ALJ’s summarized assessment of a claimant may adequately capture
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restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the assessment is
consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony. Stubbs-Danielson
v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). However, Stubbs does not stand
for the proposition that all moderate psychological limitations can always be
conflated by the ALJ into descriptive phrases. Indeed, the ALJ’s description in
Stubbs contained far more restrictive language, even though the applicant in that
case had far fewer limitations than Yasuda. Here, the reference to “simple,
unskilled work” simply did not capture the work limitations imposed by Dr.
House.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand.
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