United States v. Richard Springs

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 21 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-30073
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:14-cr-00071-JLQ-1
v.
RICHARD C. SPRINGS, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Justin L. Quackenbush, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 7, 2017
Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,** District
Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Richard Springs is charged with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 115(a)(1)(B), based on alleged threats to kill federal judges in the Western
District of Washington. The district court concluded that Springs was incompetent
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
to stand trial and ordered him hospitalized to attempt competency restoration.
Because Springs refused treatment, the government moved for permission to
involuntarily medicate him to render him competent to stand trial pursuant to Sell
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The district court granted the motion, which
Springs now appeals.
To obtain a forcible medication order under Sell, the government must prove
all four Sell factors by clear and convincing evidence. United States v. Ruiz-
Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2010). The first Sell factor—whether
important governmental interests are at stake in prosecuting the defendant for the
charged offense—is a legal question that we review de novo. See id. at 693. The
remaining Sell factors—whether involuntary medication will significantly further
the government’s interest, whether involuntary medication is necessary to further
those interests, and whether the recommended course of treatment is in the
patient’s best medical interest—we review for clear error. See id. We have
jurisdiction under the collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Sell, 539
U.S. 176–77. We affirm.
1. The district court did not err in determining “that important
government interests are at stake” in prosecuting Springs. Id. at 180. Springs
concedes that his alleged crime—threatening to kill federal judges—is serious, but
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argues that special circumstances lessen that interest. The parties do not dispute
that the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range is on the low end at 21–27 months,
and Springs has already been in custody for nearly three years. Although Springs
has been confined for a significant amount of time, and it is possible that he will be
sentenced to time served, this fact “does not totally undermine[] the strength of the
need for prosecution.” Id. Spring’s sentence, if he is convicted, is likely to include
a period of supervised release, which “would help ensure that [Springs] does not
return to making threats when released into the public.” United States v.
Gillenwater, 749 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014). Further, if Springs is convicted,
there may be less likelihood that others would make unlawful threats against
federal judges. See United States v. Onuoha, 820 F.3d 1049, 1056–57 (9th Cir.
2016) (concluding that important governmental interests were at stake in part
because of the defendant’s possible period of supervised release, the need for
general deterrence of the serious crime at issue, and because the possibility of civil
commitment was weak).
2. The district court did not clearly err in finding that “involuntary
medication will significantly further” the government’s interest in prosecuting
Springs. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. The district court heard medical testimony that
treating Springs with Abilify was substantially likely to render Springs competent
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and “substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with
[his] ability to assist counsel.” Id. This testimony was supported by studies that
described treating delusional disorder with antipsychotic medication, including
Abilify or its generic equivalent. Springs did not provide expert testimony on his
behalf or otherwise discredit the evidence offered by the government, which was
thus uncontested. And Springs himself testified that he had previously taken
Abilify and experienced some symptom abatement without serious side effects.
3. The district court did not clearly err in finding that “involuntary
medication is necessary to further” the government’s interest. Id. The district
court had previously ordered that medical staff attempt psychotherapy, and the
government’s experts explained why talk therapy was ineffective in Springs’s case.
The district court also ordered less intrusive means for administering Abilify by
first providing Springs the opportunity to take oral doses.
4. The district court did not clearly err in finding that the “administration
of drugs is medically appropriate.” Id. Several facts support this finding: Springs
previously took Abilify and testified to experiencing improvement without serious
side effects; the government’s expert testified that Abilify had the mildest side
effects of all antipsychotic drugs available to psychiatrists in the United States; and
experts testified that medication would likely provide significant medical benefits
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to Springs. Defense counsel also conceded that Abilify was an appropriate
medication to treat delusional disorder. The district court properly considered
Springs’s “long-term medical interests . . . rather than the short-term institutional
interests of the justice system” in concluding that the government met this fourth
factor. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 703.
5. The district court was not required to make a separate finding of
dangerousness. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 183. The government previously sought
permission to forcibly medicate Springs pursuant to Washington v. Harper, which
permits involuntary medication of a defendant if his mental illness renders him
dangerous to himself or to others and if the treatment is in his best medical interest.
494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). After an administrative panel determined that Springs
could not be involuntarily medicated under Harper, the government then sought
permission under Sell.
* * *
Sell orders to involuntarily medicate a defendant for the purpose of restoring
competency to stand trial are disfavored in light of the liberty interests at stake and
should occur “only in rare circumstances.” Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 687; see
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. But based on the importance of the government’s interest in
prosecuting this case, the evidentiary record presented, and the district court’s
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extensive and thoughtful fact-finding, we conclude that this is one of those rare
circumstances. We affirm the district court’s Sell order.
AFFIRMED.
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