Raj Singh v. Jefferson Sessions

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 18 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAJ KUMAR SINGH, No. 15-70442
Petitioner, Agency No. A096-174-746
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 8, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: M. SMITH and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and HUMETEWA,*** District
Judge.
Raj Kumar Singh, a citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal of the Immigration
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Diane J. Humetewa, United States District Judge for
the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
Judge’s (IJ) decision (1) denying his request for a continuance of his removal
hearing and (2) denying his application for protection under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we affirm.
1. The BIA held that the IJ did not abuse her discretion or violate Singh’s
due process rights in denying Singh’s request for a continuance to provide
additional testimony in remanded proceedings. We agree. The record is clear that
Singh, through counsel, affirmatively declined to testify, submitted the matter for a
decision on the record, and represented that any further testimony would, in any
event, be futile, due to his inability to authenticate the documentary evidence
submitted with his motion to reopen. The IJ did not prevent Singh from
“reasonably presenting [his] case” or “prevent the introduction of significant
testimony.” Cruz Rendon v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009)). The IJ acted within her
discretion in denying Singh’s request for a continuance. See id. at 1110.
2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Singh failed to
establish that he would more likely than not be tortured if removed to India. See 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Neither the evidence Singh submitted with his motion to
reopen nor the evidence he submitted with his application establishes a clear
probability of future torture.
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First, the documentary evidence Singh submitted with his motion to reopen
in 2009 consists solely of unauthenticated hearsay, to which the IJ properly
accorded less probative value. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th
Cir. 2006). Second, while Singh claims that his father died as a result of police
torture in 2007, his father’s death certificate did not indicate a cause of death, and
the affidavits submitted by Singh’s brother, mother, and village “sarpanch” stated
only generally that his father had been beaten and tortured. No evidence described
what mistreatment his father had endured or what injuries he suffered, and no
medical information corroborated the circumstances of his father’s death. Third,
Singh failed to submit current country conditions to support his claim that the
police were still pursuing him for information about Kashmiri militants over ten
years after his departure from India.
The evidence Singh submitted with his application for CAT protection in
2003 does not establish a clear probability of torture either. First, the IJ found, and
the BIA agreed, that the affidavit from the doctor who treated Singh after the
August 2002 incident lacked professionalism and was not sufficiently reliable.
Second, although Singh testified that the police beat him and applied a wooden
roller to his body in September 2002, the IJ found that the credibility of Singh’s
claim was undermined by the fact that the affidavit he submitted with his asylum
application made no mention of a wooden roller and did not include any details
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about the beating that allegedly occurred. Further, Singh submitted no medical
evidence to corroborate his testimony regarding the September 2002 incident.
As the evidence in the record does not “compel[] a contrary conclusion,” the
BIA’s determination passes muster under the substantial evidence standard.
Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007).
PETITION DENIED.
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