United States v. Francisco Robledo, Jr.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SEP 10 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-30334
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cr-02055-FVS-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
FRANCISCO ROBLEDO, Jr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Fred L. Van Sickle, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 29, 2014
Seattle, Washington
Before: NOONAN, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Francisco Robledo, Jr. was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), pursuant to a conditional guilty plea. On
appeal, Robledo challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
statements and evidence obtained by police officers prior to his being put inside a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
patrol car on the grounds that the officers’ conduct converted a Terry investigative
stop into an illegal arrest without probable cause. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
We review de novo motions to suppress brought on Fourth Amendment
grounds, United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011), and we
review for clear error a trial court’s findings of fact, United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d
877, 880 (9th Cir. 2005). We review de novo whether a seizure exceeds the
bounds of an investigatory stop and ripens into an arrest. United States v. Miles,
247 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001). Whether probable cause exists to effect an
arrest is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. See United
States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 575 (9th Cir. 2005).
We have repeatedly held that we “may affirm a district court’s denial of a
motion to suppress on any basis supported in the record.” See, e.g., United States
v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Albers, 136 F.3d 670,
672 (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we need not reach the question of whether the
officers’ conduct in this case converted a Terry investigative stop into an arrest
because we conclude that there was probable cause to arrest Robledo, both when
the officers handcuffed him and when they read him his Miranda rights.
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Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence states that “[a] police officer has
probable cause to effect an arrest if ‘at the moment the arrest was made . . . the
facts and circumstances within [his] knowledge, and of which [he] had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing’ that
the suspect had violated a criminal law.” Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1218
(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). In this case, the
totality of the circumstances known to the officers before they handcuffed and read
to Robledo his Miranda rights were sufficient to support a finding of probable
cause. After Leticia Cervantes, Robledo’s girlfriend, indicated to officers that
there was a gun in the vehicle in the driveway of 571 Peach Road, the officers
knew that there was a report of a man in the driveway of 571 Peach Road, that
gunshots had been heard, that Robledo was the only one seen there, that Robledo
had possession of the vehicle and had tossed something inside of it, that Robledo
was a convicted felon, that there was a gun in the vehicle, and that Robledo
appeared to be trying to draw attention from the vehicle as he was being
questioned. Several of the officers also knew of prior criminal activity at 571
Peach Road.
We conclude that these facts, together, were sufficient to establish probable
cause to arrest Robledo for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The totality of
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the facts and circumstances known to the officers before Robledo was either
handcuffed or mirandized, as well as the permissible “inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information available to them,” Hart v. Parks, 450
F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006), were sufficient such that a prudent person would
have been justified in concluding that Robledo had committed the crime of being a
convicted felon in possession. As the facts in this case objectively support the
reasonable conclusion that Robledo violated § 922(g)(1), we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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