United States v. Christopher Ceja

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 18 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-30178
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos.
1:19-cr-00141-SPW-1
v. 1:19-cr-00141-SPW
CHRISTOPHER SANTILLANES CEJA,
MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 5, 2022
Seattle, Washington
Before: CLIFTON and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and CHEN,** District Judge.
Christopher Ceja appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
the indictment and motion to suppress. Because there is no Speedy Trial Act or
Fourth Amendment violation, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s application of the Speedy Trial Act.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
United States v. Medina, 524 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2008). In reviewing a district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the legal conclusions de novo and
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th
Cir. 2011).
1. The district court properly denied Ceja’s motion to dismiss for a Speedy
Trial Act violation. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant’s trial generally
start within 70 days of the filing of the indictment or information. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(c)(1). Pretrial motions requiring hearings automatically pause the clock
“through the conclusion of the hearing on . . . such motion.” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D);
United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647, 655 (2011).
Ceja argues that more than 70 days elapsed because the district court
improperly excluded 26 additional days between August 14, 2020, and October 15,
2020. Ceja contends that this time period should be included in the Speedy Trial
calculation because the delays were attributable to the government or the court. But
Ceja filed a motion to suppress on June 15, 2020. The filing of the motion had the
effect of pausing the clock while the motion was under the advisement of the court.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), (H). See Medina, 524 F.3d at 979 (explaining that
pretrial motions which require a hearing automatically pause the clock even when
the delay is not “reasonably necessary”). The clock was thus paused between June
15, 2020 and December 2, 2020 (30 days after the hearing on the suppression
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motion). So the district court correctly calculated that only 69 days elapsed after
Ceja’s arraignment and did not err in denying his motion to dismiss based on a
Speedy Trial Act violation.
2. The district court did not err in denying Ceja’s motion to suppress evidence.
Police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Ceja’s car based on two independent
grounds: (1) violation of drug trafficking laws, and (2) violation of a traffic
regulation. Police officers had “specific, articulable facts” that Ceja’s car carried
drugs based on information from a confidential informant. United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Other evidence
corroborated the informant’s information. The corroborated evidence provided
“objective and reasonable inferences” for a “particularized suspicion” to stop the
car. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 326, 331–32 (1990)
(holding that an investigatory stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment when an
anonymous tip was significantly corroborated).
A police officer also witnessed Ceja committing a traffic violation and so Ceja
could be stopped based on that violation alone. See Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (holding that “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred”).
Ceja argues that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged because the traffic
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citation and the drug investigation were not conducted simultaneously. But he cites
no authority requiring the drug investigation to be conducted at the same time as the
traffic stop. Indeed, “[w]e [have] recognize[d] that an officer may prolong a traffic
stop if the prolongation itself is supported by independent reasonable suspicion.”
United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, since we conclude
that independent reasonable suspicion supported both the traffic stop and the drug
investigation, there was no unlawful prolongation of the stop.
Because none of Ceja’s other arguments supports suppressing the drug
evidence, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
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