Eugene Schneider v. Satya Jagar

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 14 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: SATYA DEVI JAGAR, No. 17-60048
Debtor, BAP No. 15-1251
------------------------------
MEMORANDUM*
EUGENE SCHNEIDER,
Appellant,
v.
SATYA DEVI JAGAR,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Kurtz, Brand, and Spraker, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 15, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, and WU,** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable George H. Wu, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
Eugene Schneider appeals from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s judgment
affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting – and subsequent judgment
resulting from – a Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052 motion brought by
Satya Devi Jagar at the close of Schneider’s case in a bench trial of Schneider’s
adversary action against Jagar in connection with her Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), and affirm.
In his adversary action, Schneider brought claims for relief under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523(a)(2)(A) and 727. The action was pointedly not a proceeding to determine
the enforceability (outside of a bankruptcy context) of Jagar’s contractual
obligations to Schneider, her attorney. Instead, the bankruptcy court correctly
determined that, for Schneider to prevail on his Section 523(a)(2)(A) claim, he
must demonstrate, among other things, an intent on Jagar’s part to deceive
Schneider, under a preponderance of the evidence standard. See Gugliuzza v. Fed.
Trade Comm’n (In re Gugliuzza), 852 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2017); Ghomeshi v.
Sabban (In re Sabban), 600 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010). It also correctly
determined that, for Schneider to prevail on his Section 727(a)(4)(A) claim, he
would have to demonstrate (again, by a preponderance of the evidence), among
other things, that Jagar made a false oath fraudulently, i.e. with the intent and
purpose of deceiving her creditors. See Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d
1189, 1197-99 (9th Cir. 2010).
2 17-60048
Having determined, under a de novo standard, that the bankruptcy court
correctly set forth the law relating to Schneider’s claims, this Court reviews the
bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error. See Hanf v. Summers (In re
Summers), 332 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). Under the prevailing explanation of that standard of
review, see, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017),
and having considered the limited evidence that Schneider presented to the
bankruptcy court, we cannot conclude that the bankruptcy court clearly erred with
respect to its factual findings bearing on the aforementioned required elements, or
that it erred in any regard with respect to its analysis of Schneider’s Section
727(a)(5) claim. Without satisfaction of the required elements, Schneider’s claims
failed, and the bankruptcy court was warranted in entering judgment against him.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c). As such, we affirm the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s
judgment.1
AFFIRMED.
1
Jagar’s request in the last sentence of her brief − that Schneider’s appeal be
deemed frivolous − is denied. See Fed. R. App. P. 38.
3 17-60048