Taylor v. California Department of Technology Services

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GENESTHER TAYLOR, No. 16-15159
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02336-MCE-
DAD
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA MEMORANDUM*
DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Genesther Taylor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her employment action alleging Title VII and state law claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations. Lukovsky v. City &
County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Taylor’s Title VII
claims because Taylor filed this action years after the applicable statute of
limitations had run. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (statute of limitations for Title
VII action is ninety days from receipt of a right-to-sue letter); Odonell v. Vencor
Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (Title VII claims are not equitably tolled
during the pendency of a related action, where the related action is commenced
after the ninety-day statute of limitations has run).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Taylor’s state law claims after dismissing her
federal claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d
1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review). We treat the dismissal of the state
law claims as a dismissal without prejudice. See Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police
Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (“When . . . the court dismisses the
federal claim leaving only state claims for resolution, the court should decline
2 16-15159
jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)).
Because we affirm the dismissal of Taylor’s action as time-barred, we do not
consider Taylor’s contentions regarding the merits of her claims.
AFFIRMED.
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