DocketNumber: 09-50231
Judges: Kozinski, Nelson, Bybee
Filed Date: 4/19/2011
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 19 2011 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-50231 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 5:08-cr-00098-VAP-1 v. MEMORANDUM* RYAN MARSHAL CLARKE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 15, 2011** Pasadena, California Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, D.W. NELSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. The district court expressly determined that “[t]he defendant’s criminal history places him in criminal history category 5.” In doing so, the court necessarily rejected Clarke’s requests for downward departures and therefore * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). page 2 complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. See United States v. Rogers,119 F.3d 1377
, 1384–85 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that a district court complied with Rule 32 by implicitly resolving an objection to the PSR). Clarke’s challenges to two conditions of supervised release similarly fail. First, the condition requiring Clarke to “notify the probation officer within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer” is not unconstitutionally vague because “men of common intelligence” needn’t “guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” United States v. Hugs,384 F.3d 762
, 768 (9th Cir. 2004). Second, the condition requiring Clarke to “permit a probation officer to visit him . . . at any time at home or elsewhere” is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Samson v. California,547 U.S. 843
, 857 (2006), nor is it constitutionally overbroad or vague, or statutorily a “greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary,” see United States v. Soltero,510 F.3d 858
, 865–67 (9th Cir. 2007). In his plea agreement, Clarke waived his “right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court, and the manner in which the sentence is determined” so long as he received a within or below Guidelines sentence. Because Clarke’s 96- month sentence falls within the relevant Guidelines range, we don’t consider his page 3 remaining arguments. See United States v. Jeronimo,398 F.3d 1149
, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005). AFFIRMED.